For: organizations that run the Zammad help-desk software themselves, and organizations that received a vulnerability notification from DIVD (the Dutch vulnerability disclosure nonprofit) and corresponded with it. This article is based on DIVD's disclosures and the developer's statements and does not cover attack techniques.
Check whether this affects you
| Your situation | What is relevant | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| You run Zammad on your own servers or in Docker | Check version and installation method: CVE-2026-102490 affects DEB/RPM packages, not source installs or official containers | Everything in "What organizations running Zammad should do today" below |
| You received a DIVD notification and exchanged emails with its CSIRT | DIVD asks you to assume the attackers may have that correspondence | Fix the reported vulnerabilities quickly. Verify any message claiming to be DIVD through another channel |
| You received a DIVD notification but never replied | According to DIVD, its initial notifications are not stored in this ticketing system | Confirm that the reported vulnerability has been fixed |
| You are a DIVD volunteer | DIVD email addresses confirmed taken; contact details possibly | Be careful with messages impersonating DIVD people |
Verify messages claiming to be DIVD through another channel
DIVD warns that because volunteers' contact details may have been taken, it is now easier to impersonate DIVD people.
If a message that appears to come from DIVD asks you to open a file, enter login details or urgently change settings, do not act on it right away. Check with DIVD through the official contact listed on its case page.
What organizations running Zammad should do today
Check your version and installation method, and work toward 7.2.2
In its October 15 release notice, the developer strongly recommends Zammad 7.2.2 for self-hosted users.
If you cannot migrate from 6.5 immediately, apply emergency release 6.5.5 for CVE-2026-102489. It requires switching to a new package repository: follow the official migration instructions linked from that notice. It does not extend support for 6.5. Do not treat 6.5.5 as a fix for both flaws; continue planning the move to 7.2.2.
For DEB/RPM packages, also verify the CVE-2026-102490 fix
The developer's October 8 advisory lists packager.io DEB/RPM packages through 7.2.1 as affected and 7.2.2 as patched. Source installations and official container images are not affected by this privilege-escalation issue.
It requires an attacker who already has code execution as the unprivileged zammad service account to gain root privileges. It does not imply a standalone remote entry point. Updating does not rule out earlier intrusion, so check logs too.
Review what you expose to the internet
If only your own staff use Zammad, put it behind a VPN or restrict the source IP addresses so it cannot be opened directly from the internet.
If customers need it to submit requests, consider whether at least the admin and agent screens can be limited by source address. The less you expose, the smaller the impact when an unknown vulnerability turns up.
Look for signs of intrusion
On its case page, DIVD publishes a log-check script and indicators of compromise (IoCs). Use them to check your Zammad logs.
Also look for admin accounts or sessions you do not recognize, and for unfamiliar programs running on the Zammad server. Be especially thorough if you had a 6.x instance exposed to the internet.
If you suspect intrusion, change the keys and passwords stored in Zammad
Because CVE-2026-102490 leads to administrator privileges, if you were breached, assume every credential on that server has been read.
Rotate the API tokens stored in Zammad, the passwords of the mailboxes it receives requests from, and the keys used for integrations with other services, and invalidate user sessions. Rebuilding the server itself is the more reliable option.
The two vulnerabilities and the published scope
CVE-2026-102489: session hijacking (session fixation) leading to code execution as the Zammad user (remote code execution). DIVD describes it as exploitable in 6.3.0 to 6.5.4 and says the first fix was in 7.2. On October 15, the developer also released emergency fix 6.5.5 for the unsupported 6.5 line.
CVE-2026-102490: privilege escalation to root by an attacker who already has code execution as the unprivileged zammad service account. The developer's October 8 advisory lists packager.io DEB/RPM packages through 7.2.1 as affected and 7.2.2 as patched. Source installations and official container images are not affected.
DIVD rates the severity of the two combined at 9.4 out of 10.
Check installation conditions as well as version numbers when applying the fix guidance. How to decide which fixes come first is covered in CVSS, EPSS and KEV.
What happened (from DIVD's disclosures)
DIVD is a volunteer-run nonprofit in the Netherlands that looks for vulnerable systems on the internet and notifies their owners. It disclosed the breach on September 24 and has posted updates on its case pages (DIVD-2026-00014 and DIVD-2026-00015). The following is as stated by DIVD.
Sep 21, 2026
Unauthorized access begins.Sep 22
Suspicious activity detected; access to all data-center systems blocked. The incident response team starts work with support from an outside forensics firm (specialists who investigate records to find the cause and scope).Sep 24
Breach disclosed publicly. The Zammad vulnerabilities reported to the developer.Sep 26
A limited disclosure of the vulnerabilities published; DIVD begins scanning for Zammad instances on the internet and notifying owners who may be vulnerable.Sep 29
Case file published (the limited disclosure of the two CVEs was on September 26). DIVD says it sees no link to any known public threat actor.Oct 1
Overview of the exfiltrated data published. The developer explains the scope on its community forum.Oct 2
CISA adds both flaws to KEV (the list of vulnerabilities confirmed exploited). Deadline for US federal agencies: October 5.
- Volunteers
- DIVD email addresses confirmed exfiltrated. Contact details possibly exfiltrated
- CSIRT ticketing system
- Holds every email sent to the CSIRT mailbox and every reply. Only part was extracted. Anyone who corresponded with the CSIRT is asked to assume the attackers may have that information
- May include
- Follow-ups on scan data (including IP addresses of vulnerable systems), vulnerabilities reported through the CSIRT mailbox, extracts of credential dumps with masked passwords
- Not included
- DIVD's initial notifications are not stored in this system
- Office cloud administration
- Under investigation
- Accounting and bank
- Run by outside parties; no signs of compromise
- Numbers
- Not disclosed
- Attacker
- No link to any known public threat actor. Whether DIVD was targeted or hit opportunistically is not confirmed
- Reports
- Reported to the Dutch data protection authority (AP) and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC); police consulted
Way in: two previously unknown Zammad vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-102489 (run code) → CVE-2026-102490 (gain root)
↓ September 21–22, 2026
DIVD CSIRT ticketing system (Zammad)
Holds every email to the CSIRT mailbox and every reply. Only part was extracted
↓ Data taken, or possibly taken
Correspondence with the CSIRT
IP addresses of vulnerable systems, reported vulnerabilities → fix the reported issues quickly
Volunteers' DIVD email addresses (confirmed) and contact details
Messages impersonating DIVD become easier → verify through another channel
Not included, or no signs of compromise
DIVD's initial notifications (not stored in this system), accounting systems and bank accounts
DIVD says network segmentation and the actions taken after detection stopped the attacker from going deeper into its network.
Why DIVD concluded an AI agent ran the intrusion
DIVD describes the post-intrusion activity as an "agentic AI-powered attack". The points it gives are these.
- It looked at the result of each action and decided the next step itself
- The attacker's scripts contained notes in which the agent justified its own actions
- Going from exploiting the flaw to administrator privileges took seconds
- It was fast, but its logic was sloppy and its activity was noisy
According to reporting by BleepingComputer, DIVD also said the agent made mistakes such as interfering with its own password-guessing attack. DIVD says the explanations the agent left behind let it reconstruct the intrusion in detail.
What DIVD's disclosures establish
- The entry point was two unknown Zammad vulnerabilities
- The post-intrusion activity is assessed as an AI agent's
- Part of the information was taken
- The attacker did not get past the network segmentation
What is not known
- Who operated the agent
- Which AI was used
- Whether DIVD was targeted or hit opportunistically
- The exact scope and number of records taken
Another case of an AI agent advancing an intrusion without waiting for human instructions is the Hugging Face intrusion of July 2026. That case involved an agent that escaped an evaluation environment; in this case, DIVD assesses that an attacker used an agent for the post-intrusion work. The wider picture of AI agents reaching websites is covered in AI agents reaching real websites.
For operators, the practical meaning is that the time between a flaw being exploited and the damage spreading gets shorter. What limited the damage at DIVD was network segmentation. Alongside faster updates, a layout where one compromised machine does not open the way to everything else pays off.
What organizations running ticketing systems should review
What leaked here was correspondence a security organization had received about other organizations' weaknesses. IP addresses of vulnerable systems and reports of still-unfixed vulnerabilities can serve an attacker as a list of next targets. A help-desk system gathers your own customers' and partners' information in the same way.
Treat the ticketing system as a system that holds important data
A help-desk system collects customer contact details, descriptions of problems, and sometimes passwords or configuration details. Classify it internally as a system holding important data, and give its updates and monitoring the same priority as your core systems.
Do not keep old tickets longer than needed
Set a retention period after which resolved tickets are deleted or moved elsewhere. For correspondence containing vulnerability reports, credentials or system configuration, consider a short deadline for deletion once the matter is closed.
Do not run versions that are out of support
According to both DIVD and the developer, the flaw used as the entry point can be exploited on the 6.x line, which the developer no longer supports. Help-desk systems tend to be installed once and then left behind on updates. Record the support end date in your inventory and plan the upgrade before it arrives.
Separate the ticketing server from your other systems
DIVD says its network segmentation stopped the damage from spreading. Make sure the help-desk server cannot freely connect to your other internal systems or admin interfaces. The approach is covered in The minimum security baseline for organizations.
Sources (public record)
The facts in this article come from the public sources below. Undisclosed attack techniques and the identity of the attacker are not speculated on.
- DIVD, "DIVD-2026-00014" (incident overview and timeline; exploitation links and fix guidance partially rechecked October 20) — csirt.divd.nl
- DIVD, data investigation overview (DIVD-2026-00014) — csirt.divd.nl
- DIVD, "DIVD-2026-00015" (the Zammad vulnerabilities, affected versions, log-check script) — csirt.divd.nl
- DIVD, "CVE-2026-102489" — csirt.divd.nl / "CVE-2026-102490" — csirt.divd.nl
- Zammad community forum (statements by the developer's staff, October 1, 2026) — community.zammad.org
- Zammad release notes (7.2, September 23, 2026) — zammad.com / security advisories — github.com
- Zammad, CVE-2026-102490 developer advisory (October 8, 2026) — github.com
- Zammad, "6.5.5" (October 15, 2026; emergency fix and recommendation to move to 7.2.2) — zammad.com
- CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (added October 2, 2026) — cisa.gov
- Reporting: BleepingComputer, "Automated AI agent used to breach cybersecurity nonprofit DIVD" (September 29, 2026) — bleepingcomputer.com
- Reporting: BleepingComputer, "DIVD says Zammad zero-days enabled AI-driven network breach" (September 30, 2026) — bleepingcomputer.com
Update history
2026-10-20: Partially rechecked DIVD's two exploitation links and disclosure dates, and the developer's October 8 and 15 fix guidance. Corrected the recommendation of 7.2.0 and the statement that the second fix was unconfirmed. This was not a full re-verification of exposed data, numbers or authority reports.
2026-10-05: First version, based on DIVD's disclosures (through the October 1 update), the developer's statements (October 1) and CISA's KEV addition (October 2).
Read next
- AI-agent intrusions: The Hugging Face intrusion (2026) / AI agents reaching real websites
- Fix priorities: How to decide which CVEs to fix first (CVSS, EPSS, KEV)
- Terms: Session fixation / Remote code execution (RCE) / IoC (indicators of compromise) / Phishing
- For operators: The minimum security baseline for organizations
- Other 2026 incidents: list of breaches and cyberattacks (Japan and worldwide)