For: current students, alumni, parents and staff of Osaka Metropolitan University, people considering applying there, and IT staff at universities, companies and local governments that run many servers on a virtualization platform. This article is based on the official notices from Osaka Metropolitan University and major news reports, and does not cover attack techniques.
Developing: this article will be updated as the organisation publishes more
- Who is affected
current students, alumni, parents and staff of Osaka Metropolitan University, people considering applying there, and IT staff at universities, companies and local governments that run many servers on a virtualization platform.
- Confirmed so farSee the table ↓
- IDs, names, email addresses, dates of birth and similar personal data (students and staff)
- Important management information of the university (including administrator information for its systems)
- Bank account numbers
4 more
- Health-related information
- Passport images
- Passport numbers
- Why the data stayed so long
Listed as possibly affected
- Leak of personal data from the university's own information systems
- Not yet confirmed
- The range of affected people and the types of personal data (the contractor is still investigating)
- The university's individual explanation and apology to affected people (once they are identified)
- Whether personal data leaked from the university's own information systems (no clear fact confirmed, but a leak cannot be ruled out)
1 more
- When the core systems will be restored (the October 23 status notice is internal only; its text is not public)
- What to do nowSee the steps ↓
- Check notices from the OMU Entrance page
- Do not follow links or instructions in emails, texts or calls claiming to be from the university
- Wait for the university's individual notice, and check it is genuine when it arrives
4 more
- If bank, health, passport or passport-number data was included
- Switch your password by following the university's instructions, on its genuine screen
- Do not reply to anyone who says they have your data
- Alumni and parents: compare any message with the university's announcements, and use the help desk if in doubt
- Where to verify (source)All sources ↓
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "本学情報基盤システムにおける障害の発生について【第1報】" (first notice on the failure of the information infrastructure system, October 2, 2026)
- Last checked
- As of November 14, 2026
Follow-up plans and what we checked
In its sixth notice of November 13, the university says the contractor is still investigating the range of affected people and the types of personal data, and that it will contact each affected person individually once they are identified. It says it will keep investigating its own systems and explain to affected people as a case where a leak is possible. A library notice published on October 23 says there is still no prospect of restoring the library system or network, so opening days, hours, eligible users and services remain limited for now.
What students, alumni and staff should do now
Check notices from the OMU Entrance page
The main website (www.omu.ac.jp) is down. The university says it posts the latest information on classes and admissions on the OMU Entrance page (https://e.omu.ac.jp/). On October 3 it also opened a temporary notice site (https://www.omu.moe/) to use until the official website is restored, and this address appears in the press conference handout.
Because the temporary site uses an unfamiliar domain, it is harder to tell apart from look-alike fake sites. Open it by following the link on the Entrance page you bookmarked, not from links in emails or texts.
Do not follow links or instructions in emails, texts or calls claiming to be from the university
The leaked information included IDs, names, email addresses, dates of birth and more (sixth notice). A message with your correct name and student details is not proof that it is genuine.
Do not respond to messages that ask you to enter your ID, password or card number on a linked page, whether they mention "apologies for the outage", "account reset", "student ID reissue" or "tuition or scholarship procedures". Ask about anything suspicious through a contact point you found on the Entrance page (how to spot fakes: What is phishing).
Wait for the university's individual notice, and check it is genuine when it arrives
The university says it will contact each affected person individually, with an explanation and an apology, once they are identified. The sixth notice does not say how it will make contact. When a message arrives, before opening any link in it, check that the same notice appears on the OMU Entrance page or the temporary notice site and that its contact point matches the university's official one.
Fake messages could also pose as that notice and ask for a bank account number, PIN, password or a photo of your passport. The university does not say it will ask you to email extra information. Even if asked, do not send anything until you have confirmed the request with the official contact point.
If bank, health, passport or passport-number data was included
According to Annex 1 of the sixth notice, the highly sensitive data covers bank account numbers (about 20 people); health-related information (about 200 staff and students enrolled in fiscal 2018 to 2021); passport images (about 200 foreign nationals who studied there in fiscal 2018 to 2021); and passport numbers (about 1,000 students enrolled in those years who were covered by JCSOS (overseas travelers)). You find out whether you are included from the university's individual notice.
If bank account details were included: any message asking for your account PIN or password is fake. Check your passbook or app for deposits or withdrawals you do not recognize and, if anything looks wrong, tell your bank and the police (#9110).
If passport images or numbers were included: watch for fake messages about travel procedures or identity checks. Follow the university's individual notice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' guidance on whether to reissue your passport, and do not rush that decision yourself.
If health-related information was included: a message that seems to know about your medical visits can look more genuine than it is. Do not open links in it or reply, whatever it says.
Switch your password by following the university's instructions, on its genuine screen
In an October 10 notice, the university says that, as an emergency response to the ransomware attack, it has been asking users to switch their OMU authentication system password to a new one. People who have not yet set up two-factor authentication cannot set it up or reset it for now and are asked to wait for further instructions.
Check that the instruction also appears on the temporary notice site opened from the Entrance page, then switch your password on the university's genuine login screen. Do not do it through links in emails or texts.
If you use the same password as your university account on other services, change those to different passwords now (how to check: How to check if your password has leaked; a tool for keeping them separate: Choosing a password manager).
Do not reply to anyone who says they have your data
If you receive a message from someone claiming to hold your information and asking for payment or a reply, do not reply, pay, or enter anything on a linked page. Keep the message, and report it to the university and, in Japan, to the police consultation line #9110.
The recipient has no way to check whether the sender really has the data. Responding can mark your address as active and lead to more messages.
Alumni and parents: compare any message with the university's announcements, and use the help desk if in doubt
Unlike current students, alumni and parents do not check university notices every day, so fake messages are harder to notice. If you get a message about "confirming the alumni list", "alumni association fees" or "issuing certificates", check whether the same information appears on the Entrance page or the temporary notice site.
On October 23 the university opened a consultation and inquiry desk for alumni and parents. You can use the form in the notice "本学情報基盤システムにおける障害にともなう相談・問い合わせ窓口について" on the temporary notice site (the phone line was to be posted later as of October 23, and we have not been able to confirm that it has been posted). If you receive suspicious contact that may be linked to this incident, report it there.
As of November 14, the university's official notices do not say which alumni are covered overall (how many years back, or whether graduates of its predecessors, Osaka City University and Osaka Prefecture University, are included); part of the highly sensitive data is described as relating to people enrolled in fiscal 2018 to 2021. The sixth notice also lists the contractor's inquiry line for people concerned (0120-45-3021, 11:30 to 14:00, closed Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays).
What happened (from Osaka Metropolitan University's notices)
The university issued its first and second notices on October 2, held a press conference on October 5, posted a summary of the conference and the handout on its temporary notice site on October 6, issued a fourth notice on October 8 and a fifth on October 21, opened a help desk for alumni and parents on October 23, and issued a sixth on November 13. Unless stated otherwise, the following is based on the university's notices and handout.
October 2, 2026, around 0:20 a.m.
The contractor responsible for maintenance noticed the servers of the information infrastructure system shutting down one after another and began investigating.October 2, around 1:40–4:00 a.m.
The contractor notified the university's IT department. Staff went on site, and the investigation found that a group of virtual servers had stopped and that some data showed signs of tampering.October 2, morning
Around 7 a.m., class cancellations were announced on the Entrance page. Around 8 a.m. the university reported to Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, and at 8:15 it set up a crisis response headquarters headed by the president. Around 11 a.m. it reported to the Ministry of Education, information security organizations and the police.October 2, afternoon
First notice (cause under investigation) and second notice issued. Classes were cancelled through October 8, with in-person classes planned to resume from October 9.October 3, around 7:30 a.m.
A temporary website for announcements was opened.October 5
Around 10 a.m. the university contacted the Personal Information Protection Commission. At a press conference from 4 p.m., it said it had concluded the cause was a ransomware attack.October 8
Fourth notice: with the investigation and recovery still under way, the university announced that in-person classes would resume at all campuses on Friday, October 9. The same day, OMU Mail between students and staff became available again.October 10
On the switch to a new OMU authentication system password, the university said people who had not set up two-factor authentication could not do so for now.October 20
The contractor that maintains and operates the core systems reported that a subcontractor had been hit by a cyberattack in late September and the university's systems had been accessed using the subcontractor's legitimate account, and that university-related personal data and system information in cloud storage the contractor used had been confirmed as leaked.October 21
Fifth notice: the university published the report and said the contents and numbers of the leaked data are being checked with the contractor. The academic-affairs data flagged at the press conference (about 130,000 records, among others) is in the university's virtualization platform and separate; whether it leaked is still under investigation.October 23
A consultation and inquiry desk opened for alumni and parents (a form; phone line to be posted later). The library said there is still no prospect of restoring its system or network and it will keep operating with limited functions.November 12
The contractor gave an additional report on the information that leaked from its cloud storage. It included important management information of the university (including administrator information) and personal data of about 170,000 students and staff, of which about 1,400 people had highly sensitive data.November 13
Sixth notice and Annexes 1 and 2 published. The university said signs showed that a large amount of data leaked from the subcontractor's device and the contractor's cloud storage, that right after that its systems were accessed using legitimate accounts and passwords, and that the investigation firm judges both intrusions to be by the same attacker.
- What happened
- From the early hours of October 2, a large-scale failure hit the university's virtualization platform. A group of virtual servers stopped, and some data showed signs of tampering
- Cause
- Concluded to be a cyberattack, namely a ransomware attack (October 5). According to the sixth notice (November 13), a device at the subcontractor was hit first, and signs show a large amount of data leaked from it and from cloud storage managed by the contractor. Right after that, the university's systems were accessed using legitimate accounts (including administrator accounts) and passwords used by the contractor and subcontractor. The investigation firm reports the same attacker
- Response (sixth notice)
- It will explain to and apologize to each affected person individually once they are identified, and will strengthen measures against recurrence, including tighter management of how contractors perform their work. It asks everyone concerned to be careful about suspicious phone calls and impersonating emails
- Main systems affected
- Campus network, OMU Mail, the corporation's websites, the staff portal, office PCs (staff cannot log in), finance and accounting, HR and payroll, academic affairs, learning support systems, the admissions database, the library system (the handout describes this as a partial list)
- Reported as unaffected
- The first notice said the systems of the university hospital and the veterinary medical center were unaffected. The online application and enrollment sites run on external servers and can be used
- Personal data (contractor's cloud storage)
- According to the contractor's additional report of November 12: important management information of the university (including administrator information for its systems), and personal data such as IDs, names, email addresses and dates of birth of about 170,000 students and staff. Part of it, about 1,400 people, was highly sensitive (bank account numbers: about 20; health-related information: about 200; passport images: about 200; passport numbers: about 1,000). Most is data from the fiscal 2021 system migration work that stayed in the storage after the work ended (sixth notice, Annex 1). The contractor is still investigating the range of affected people and the types of data
- Personal data (university's information systems)
- According to the sixth notice, the university has not confirmed that personal data leaked from its own information systems. Because there was unauthorized access and many systems were encrypted, it says a leak cannot be ruled out and it will explain to affected people as a case where a leak is possible. The data flagged at the October 5 press conference as possibly leaked (about 130,000 academic-affairs records, among others) is data in the university's own systems (fifth notice). The Personal Information Protection Commission was contacted on October 5
- Reported to
- Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, the Ministry of Education, the police, information security organizations including JPCERT (Japan's computer security incident coordination center), and the Personal Information Protection Commission
- Contact
- Alumni and parents: the consultation and inquiry desk opened on October 23 (a form; the phone line was to be posted later as of October 23). For people concerned (sixth notice): the contractor's inquiry line, 0120-45-3021 (11:30 to 14:00, closed Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays). Applications and enrollment: Admissions Office, 072-254-9117. A list of contact points is in the "お問い合わせ先について" (contact points) notice on the temporary notice site
- Recovery status (public)
- The notice on core-system recovery status and outlook (as of October 23) is internal only and its text is not public. The public library notice (October 23) says there is still no prospect of restoring the library system or network
What is known and what is not
Organized from the university's announcement of November 13 (sixth notice and Annex 1), as of November 14, 2026. We will update the status column when more is published.
| Item | What the notice says | Status |
|---|---|---|
| IDs, names, email addresses, dates of birth and similar personal data (students and staff) | About 170,000 people's data leaked from the contractor's cloud storage | Leak confirmed (university) |
| Important management information of the university (including administrator information for its systems) | Leaked from the same cloud storage | Leak confirmed (university) |
| Bank account numbers | About 20 people | Leak confirmed (university) |
| Health-related information | About 200 staff and students enrolled in fiscal 2018 to 2021 | Leak confirmed (university) |
| Passport images | About 200 foreign nationals who studied there in fiscal 2018 to 2021 | Leak confirmed (university) |
| Passport numbers | About 1,000 students enrolled in fiscal 2018 to 2021 who were covered by JCSOS (overseas travelers) | Leak confirmed (university) |
| Range of affected people and types of data | The contractor is still investigating; the university will contact each affected person individually once identified | Under investigation |
| Leak of personal data from the university's own information systems | No clear fact confirmed, but a leak cannot be ruled out because many systems were encrypted | Possible (university) |
| Why the data stayed so long | Most is data from the fiscal 2021 system migration work and stayed in the contractor's cloud storage after the work ended. The university calls this a serious problem | Confirmed (university announcement) |
| How the intruder got in | Judged to have abused account information and passwords stolen via the subcontractor's device and the contractor's cloud storage; the investigation firm reports the same attacker for both intrusions | University's judgment |
| Ransom demand | The university reportedly declined to comment, citing the investigation | Not stated |
What news reports say
The October 5 press conference was covered by Kyodo News, Nikkei, the Sankei Shimbun, the Asahi Shimbun, Kansai TV, Yomiuri TV and others. Figures that do not appear in the university's official notices are treated as news reports, as follows. In its fifth notice of October 21, the university itself describes the figure given at the press conference as "about 130,000 records related to the academic affairs system, among others" (records, unlike the "about 130,000 people" in reports).
What several major outlets agree on
- About 500 servers stopped
- Much of the backup data was also encrypted (Kansai TV, Yomiuri TV)
- Personal data on at least about 130,000 people, including current students and alumni, may have been leaked
- The stored data includes names, home addresses, email addresses and student ID photos
Not confirmed, or differs between reports
- Whether data in the university's own information systems was actually leaked (the university has not confirmed a leak but says it cannot be ruled out; data in the contractor's cloud storage is confirmed as leaked)
- Other items such as phone numbers (reports differ)
- How far staff and graduates of the predecessor universities are included
- Whether a ransom was demanded (the university declined to comment, citing the investigation)
How to read it: about 130,000 records and about 170,000 people are different figures
The Asahi Shimbun and others describe about 130,000 people as the amount of personal data stored in the affected systems. In its fifth notice, the university places this as data in its virtualization platform that "may have" leaked (about 130,000 academic-affairs records, among others), and in its sixth notice it says it has not clearly confirmed a leak from its own information systems. What has been confirmed as leaked is different data, in the contractor's cloud storage, which the sixth notice puts at about 170,000 people. The two figures cannot be added together or treated as the same group.
Fake messages can arrive while everyone waits for confirmation. Even before you know whether you are affected, the steps above are worth starting today.
What is particular to this incident: when a virtualization platform stops, hundreds of servers stop at once
A virtualization platform runs many servers (virtual servers) together on a set of physical servers. It reduces hardware and simplifies management, but when that base stops, every server running on it stops too.
According to the university, the failure of its virtualization platform stopped a group of virtual servers, and very different systems, from the network and email to academic affairs and payroll, became unusable at the same time. News reports say much of the backup data that would be used for recovery was also encrypted. In its sixth notice the university says access came through legitimate accounts (including administrator accounts) and passwords used by the contractor and subcontractor, but it has not disclosed how far the encryption spread or the state of its backups, so what follows is about this kind of setup in general.
Same management domain
Virtualization platform admin account
↓ controls both
Hundreds of virtual servers
Backups
→ production and backups become unusable together
Separate management domains
Virtualization admin
Backup-only admin (with MFA)
↓ separate permissions
Hundreds of virtual servers
Copy that cannot be deleted for a set period, or kept offline
→ even if production stops, there is something to restore from
Having backups is not enough if they sit where the same production permissions can reach them; in an incident they can become unusable too. In the 2021 Handa Hospital (Tsurugi Town) incident, the investigation report also recorded that the backup server was among the encrypted servers. What this incident adds is scale. To restore hundreds of servers, you need not only a surviving copy but also a decided order and a known number of hours to bring them back.
For organizations running many servers on a virtualization platform
The points below do not claim that Osaka Metropolitan University's response was inadequate. They are precautions drawn from the facts in the notices and reports. The basics of the 3-2-1 rule and restore testing are in Backup basics (the 3-2-1 rule). Here we add what is specific to virtualization platforms.
Keep one backup that the virtualization admins cannot delete
First, list which people and which accounts can delete or overwrite backups. If the virtualization platform's admin account, or the admin of the directory that manages everyday user accounts, can delete them, the backups are in the same management domain as production.
As a first step, create a separate admin account just for backups, protect it with multi-factor authentication, and keep at least one copy either in a setting where it cannot be deleted or overwritten for a set period (immutable storage) or in storage that is normally disconnected from the network. Many backup products and cloud storage services offer a feature that blocks deletion during the retention period.
Measure restore drills in servers and hours
Measure not only "can we restore?" but "how many hours does it take to restore the systems we need to resume teaching or business?" For a university, decide the order needed to resume in advance, for example authentication, email, the learning management system, academic affairs, then the network.
Once a year, restore the top 10 servers from the disconnected copy into a separate environment, and record how long it takes. Multiply that by the number of servers to estimate how long a full restore would take. If the estimate is too long, that is a sign to rethink how backups are taken or how priorities are set.
List the accounts contractors and subcontractors use, and do not leave migrated data with them
According to the university's sixth notice, after a subcontractor's device was breached, account information and passwords stolen from cloud storage managed by the contractor were abused. Most of the leaked personal data was also data from the fiscal 2021 system migration work that had stayed in that same storage after the work ended. What follows is general preparation drawn from that sequence.
First, list which of your systems your maintenance and development contractors, and their subcontractors, can sign in to, and with which accounts. Then check whether each has multi-factor authentication, restrictions on where it can connect from, or is enabled only during scheduled work. Also check that administrator accounts and passwords are not kept in a place many contractor staff can reach.
Next, write into the contract when data handed to a contractor for migration or build work must be deleted after the work ends, and how deletion is confirmed. Review whether personal data, bank details and passport data really need to be handed over for migration at all. Asking contractors to check whether data from finished projects still remains with them is also worthwhile.
Prepare and publicize a channel that still works when the platform is down
The university's notices show that its online application site, run on external servers, kept working, that it could announce class cancellations on the Entrance page on the morning of the outage, and that it opened a temporary notice site the next morning. When email and the official website go down together, the means of reaching users disappears.
Prepare an outage notice page in normal times that runs with a different provider and different admin accounts from production. If you tell students and partners its address in advance, they will not have to guess whether an unfamiliar domain is fake during an outage.
How ransomware works and how organizations can prepare is covered in What is ransomware, and cases where hospital systems stopped are in Hospitals whose care was disrupted by cyberattacks in 2026.
Sources (public record)
The facts in this article are based on the public information below. We do not speculate on attack methods or causes the university has not disclosed. Figures that come only from news reports are identified as such in the text.
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "本学情報基盤システムにおける障害の発生について【第1報】" (first notice on the failure of the information infrastructure system, October 2, 2026) — temporary notice site
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "本学情報基盤システムにおける障害の発生について【第2報】" (second notice, October 2, 2026) — temporary notice site
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "情報基盤システムにおける障害に関する記者会見を実施" (press conference held, October 6, 2026) and the press conference handout (October 5) — temporary notice site / handout (PDF)
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "本学情報基盤システムにおける障害の発生について【第4報】対面授業再開のお知らせ" (fourth notice: in-person classes resume, October 8, 2026) — temporary notice site
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "【学生向け】OMUメール利用再開について" (OMU Mail resumes, October 8, 2026) — temporary notice site
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "OMU認証システムについて(二要素認証できない人について)" (OMU authentication system and two-factor setup, October 10, 2026) — temporary notice site
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "本学情報基盤システムにおける障害の発生について【第5報】委託先公表のサイバー攻撃事案に伴うシステム障害・情報漏洩について" (fifth notice: system outage and data leak following a cyberattack disclosed by the contractor, October 21, 2026) — temporary notice site
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "本学情報基盤システムにおける障害の発生について【第6報】" (sixth notice, November 13, 2026) with Annex 1 (timeline and the contents and numbers of highly sensitive information) and Annex 2 (outline of the unauthorized access and data leak) — university website / Annex 1 (PDF) / Annex 2 (PDF)
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "本学情報基盤システムにおける障害にともなう相談・問い合わせ窓口について" (consultation and inquiry desk for alumni and parents, October 23, 2026) — temporary notice site
- Osaka Metropolitan University, "図書館の開館について" (library opening, version published October 23, 2026) — temporary notice site
- Osaka Metropolitan University, OMU Entrance page (outage information and class cancellation notices) — e.omu.ac.jp
- NHK News (report on the university's press conference, October 5, 2026) — news.web.nhk
- Kyodo News, "大阪公立大にランサム攻撃 個人情報、13万人流出恐れ" (October 5, 2026, via Kahoku Shimpo Online) — kahoku.news
- Nikkei, "大阪公立大学にランサム攻撃 個人情報、13万人流出恐れ" (October 5, 2026) — nikkei.com
- The Sankei Shimbun, "大阪公立大の大規模システム障害、サイバー攻撃が原因か 13万人超の個人情報流出恐れ" (October 5, 2026, via Yahoo! News Japan) — news.yahoo.co.jp
- The Asahi Shimbun, "大阪公立大のシステム障害「ランサムウェアによる攻撃」大学が発表" (October 5, 2026, via Yahoo! News Japan) — news.yahoo.co.jp
- Kansai TV, "大阪公立大 大規模システム障害の原因は「ランサムウェアによるサイバー攻撃」か" (October 5, 2026) — ktv.jp
- Yomiuri TV, "大阪公立大学にサイバー攻撃か サーバー500台停止し全学部休講" (October 5, 2026, via Infoseek News) — news.infoseek.co.jp
- Government of Japan public relations, "警察に対する相談は警察相談専用電話「#9110」番へ" (police consultation line #9110) — gov-online.go.jp
Update history
2026-10-06: First version, based on Osaka Metropolitan University's first and second notices of October 2, the October 5 press conference and its handout, and major news reports. The university says whether personal data was leaked is under investigation; we will update this article when new facts are published.
2026-10-11: Added the October 8 fourth notice (in-person classes resume at all campuses from October 9), the resumption of internal OMU Mail, and the October 10 notice on switching OMU authentication system passwords; rewrote the password step. Whether personal data was leaked was still under investigation as of October 11.
2026-10-24: Added the October 21 fifth notice (the contractor reported that the cause was unauthorized access using a subcontractor's legitimate account, that university-related personal data and system information in the contractor's cloud storage had been confirmed as leaked, and that this is separate from the about 130,000 records and other data in the virtualization platform), the October 23 help desk for alumni and parents, and the October 23 library notice (no prospect of restoration yet). Updated the title, description, bottom line, timeline, fact list and FAQ, and added a "not yet known" box and a step for organizations on listing contractor accounts. The October 23 notice on recovery status and outlook is internal only and its text is not public, so it is not reflected.
2026-11-14: Updated the leak from the contractor's cloud storage to personal data of about 170,000 people, about 1,400 of them highly sensitive. Based on the November 13 sixth notice and Annexes 1 and 2, added the breakdown (bank account numbers: about 20; health-related information: about 200; passport images: about 200; passport numbers: about 1,000), that most was data from the fiscal 2021 system migration work, that the intruder is judged to have used account information stolen after a subcontractor's device was breached, and that a leak from the university's own information systems is not confirmed but cannot be ruled out. Updated the title, description, bottom line, status box, table, steps and FAQ, and added what affected people should watch for, how to check the university's individual notice, and a step on not leaving migrated data with contractors.
Read next
- Protecting yourself from fake messages: What is phishing / Choosing a password manager
- Ransomware and backups: What is ransomware / Backup basics (the 3-2-1 rule) / The Handa Hospital incident
- Similar incidents in Japan: Saga University ransomware attack / Medica Shuppan ransomware attack / Hospitals disrupted by cyberattacks
- Other 2026 incidents: Data breaches and cyberattacks in 2026 (Japan and worldwide)