tag

VPN

11 articles with this tag

2026-11-21

Osaki Electric Ransomware Attack: VPN Login Broken, Smart Meter Production and Shipping Halted, Apparent Technical Data Posted (Second Report, November 20)

On November 18, 2026, Osaki Electric Co., Ltd. announced that its systems were hit by a ransomware attack confirmed on November 17 (first report). It stopped the production-related systems of its Saitama works and two group companies, and production and shipping of smart meters and similar products cannot take place; no restart date is set. In its second report of November 20, the company says unauthorised access is estimated to have started around 1:30 on November 15 through its VPN device, that some accounts without multi-factor authentication remained, and that it is highly likely the authentication was broken by repeated password attempts. Some virtual servers were encrypted. On November 19 it found technical information that appears to be stored on its systems posted on a site that appears to be run by the attacker; the scope is under investigation. Backups are confirmed intact, and operations will resume in phases where safety is confirmed. The company says its products and services are not affected. Bottom line: partners should confirm delivery through their business contact and ignore messages impersonating the company; any organisation with a VPN should check today that every account has multi-factor authentication.

2026-11-21

SonicWall Gen 6 firewalls have reached end of support (notice of 18 November 2026): no patches for any severity. What to do today

On 18 November 2026 SonicWall published the product advisory "Retire Unsupported Gen 6 Firewalls". It covers every Gen 6 and Gen 6.5 firewall running SonicOS 6.x, including the Gen 6 NSv virtual firewalls, and says all listed models have reached end of support. SonicWall no longer releases firmware updates or security patches for them, whatever the severity of a newly found vulnerability, and support can no longer be bought or renewed. The end-of-support dates range from March 2024 (NSA 2600) to 1 October 2026 (TZ350, TZ500, SOHO 250 and the NSA 4600, 5600 and 6600 and NSa 4650, 5650 and 6650 models). SonicWall tells customers to replace these firewalls with Gen 8 (SonicOS 8) and, until then, to reduce exposure by disabling WAN management, disabling SSL VPN or restricting it to known source addresses, enforcing multi-factor authentication, resetting local passwords, turning off unused services and watching the logs. This is not a new vulnerability. It means that from now on any flaw found in these devices stays open. This site's conclusion: list every Gen 6 unit, starting with those that face the internet or provide remote access, apply the interim steps today, and plan the replacement now.

2026-10-31

Ivanti Connect Secure CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527: two more flaws added to CISA KEV (what to do about the October attacks)

On October 30, 2026, CISA added two Ivanti Connect Secure vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog: CVE-2026-111357, a local privilege escalation to root, and CVE-2026-118527, a predictable-identifier flaw that lets a remote authenticated attacker place files with attacker-controlled content at a known location. CISA says both can be chained with CVE-2026-104935, the authentication bypass added to KEV on October 13. On November 2 a US research firm reported that Ivanti updated its advisory on October 29 to add the two CVEs and released fixes (we could not read Ivanti's advisory itself, so this relies on the firm's quotation of it): 25.1.1.3 for 25.1.1.2 and prior, and 22.8R2.6 for 22.8R2.5 and prior. The October 13 fixes (25.1.1.2 and 22.8R2.5) do not fix these two. Ivanti recommends moving from 22.8.x to 25.1.1.3 or later, or applying 22.8R2.6 if that is not immediately possible. Ivanti says exploitation before disclosure affected a limited number of customers, chained with CVE-2026-104935. The due date for US federal agencies is November 2 for CVE-2026-111357 and November 13 for CVE-2026-118527. Another research firm reports exploitation from October 3, credential theft, and Active Directory queries for Windows LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys. CISA and the firm warn that Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool may not detect exploitation. Our conclusion: patch now, and even after patching, treat any appliance that was reachable from the internet since early October as possibly compromised until a forensic check says otherwise. Preserve memory and logs before any reboot or reset, and rotate credentials, including LAPS-managed local administrator passwords and BitLocker recovery keys. Confirm version numbers in Ivanti's advisory.

2026-10-29

Cisco ASA and FTD VPN flaw CVE-2026-76418: an unauthenticated attacker can reload the device (how to check, fixed releases)

On October 28, 2026 (UTC), Cisco disclosed CVE-2026-76418 (CVSS v3.1 8.6) in the remote access SSL VPN service of Cisco Secure Firewall ASA and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD). An unauthenticated remote attacker can make the device reload unexpectedly, causing a denial of service. The cause is a logic error when secondary authentication is configured on a tunnel group (a VPN connection profile), triggered by a crafted request while connecting to the SSL VPN. The advisory describes no code execution or data leak. There is no workaround, and Cisco strongly recommends upgrading. Cisco PSIRT says it became aware of exploitation in October 2026 but gives no details. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on October 29, with a due date of November 1 for US federal agencies. Our conclusion: if you expose SSL VPN on ASA or FTD, check whether any tunnel group uses secondary authentication and upgrade if so. Cisco's interim mitigations exist but lower security.

2026-10-26

FortiBleed (FortiGate credential leak, about 74,000 devices): not a new vulnerability, so admin and VPN passwords must be changed

FortiBleed is the large-scale leak and misuse of administrator and SSL VPN credentials for FortiGate, Fortinet's firewall and VPN appliance. On June 18, 2026, CISA warned that credentials associated with about 74,000 devices had leaked. On June 19, Fortinet said it is not a new vulnerability and that the activity likely involves reuse of credentials from previous incidents plus brute-forcing of devices with weak passwords and no multi-factor authentication. On June 23, JPCERT/CC issued an alert saying it had confirmed that the data includes information related to Japanese companies. On October 6, the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service warned that the activity continues, that some administrators have been locked out of their devices, and that the access has been used as an entry point for ransomware. Upgrading to fixed firmware does not invalidate leaked passwords. This site's conclusion: if you run FortiGate, change admin and VPN passwords, enforce multi-factor authentication, take the management interface off the internet, and remove the legacy SHA-256 copies of admin passwords.

2026-10-24

Exploited edge device vulnerabilities, mid-October 2026: Ivanti, PAN-OS, FortiOS, Cisco

Between October 13 and 16, 2026, CISA added four vulnerabilities in widely deployed edge devices (equipment that sits at the boundary between a network and the internet) to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog: Ivanti Connect Secure CVE-2026-104935 (authentication bypass, no login needed, CVSS 8.6), Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS CVE-2026-0322 (code execution in the management interface, high-privilege login needed, CVSS v4.0 8.6), Fortinet FortiOS and related products CVE-2025-61624 (path traversal, admin login needed, CVSS 6.0), and Cisco Secure Email Gateway CVE-2026-76519 (arbitrary file write, no login needed, CVSS 9.8). Atlassian Data Center CVE-2026-21589 (file read, no login needed) followed on October 15. All federal due dates have passed. This site's conclusion: if you run any of these five products, upgrade to a fixed release today, restrict management access to administrative networks, and check for compromise before upgrading.

2026-09-30

Hospital Cyberattacks in 2026: Care Disruptions and Patient Guidance

In 2026, cyberattacks disrupted care at hospitals in the US, Belgium and Japan. Laid side by side, the hospitals' own statements show one pattern: inpatient and emergency care continued on paper under downtime procedures, while outpatient clinics, chemotherapy, the hospital pharmacy, appointment phones, the patient portal, ambulance intake and imaging stopped — the functions that connect a hospital to the outside. Downtime procedures should be written for those outward-facing functions, not only for the wards. The way in can be equipment nobody counts as a clinical system, such as a VPN appliance used to maintain medical devices. Patients should check official channels, take urgent medication needs to the hospital's designated line, and not answer suspicious calls claiming to be the hospital.

2026-09-11

VPN Appliances Are the Main Way In for Ransomware: Remote Access Defense After Japan's Digital Agency Breach

A VPN appliance connects the internet to an organisation's internal network, and in Japan it is how attackers got in in roughly two thirds of ransomware cases where the route is known. The Digital Agency's GSS incident followed the same shape: in through a VPN vulnerability, then a maintenance operator's account used to reach a large volume of files. This site's view: only keep a VPN appliance if you can keep patching it, and defend it with three things: patch speed, narrow privileges after an intrusion, and detecting bulk access.

Critical2026-07-18

Tsurugi Handa Hospital ransomware (2021) — an unpatched VPN CVE and backups encrypted along with production

The way in, per the expert committee's report, was an internet-facing VPN device left unpatched against a known vulnerability (CVE-2018-13379), reachable with leaked credentials. Short passwords, no account lockout, and users holding admin rights made it easy to spread to other machines in the hospital (lateral movement). Decisively, the primary system and its backup were on the same network and both were encrypted. A backup that isn't isolated and offline can't be relied on for recovery. EMR recovery took about two months. Defend by patching internet-facing VPNs fast, revoking leaked/reused credentials, and keeping isolated, offline, 3-2-1 backups.

Critical2026-07-18

Osaka General Medical Center ransomware (2022) — a contractor's VPN as the way in, and hospital BCP

The way in was not the hospital itself but a meal-service contractor's remote-maintenance VPN device, which was unpatched and reachable using leaked credentials, the investigation committee found. Because the hospital and contractor were constantly connected, and because servers/PCs shared passwords, users held broad admin rights, EMR servers lacked antivirus, and the network wasn't segmented, the encryption spread across the EMR system. Outpatient care, surgery, and emergency intake were restricted; full recovery took over two months. Defend by treating contractor links as your own attack surface: patch internet-facing VPNs, end credential reuse, least privilege, segment, and build a medical BCP (paper fallback, tested restore).

High2026-07-07

Capcom Ransomware (2020) — Why an Old VPN Device Was the Way In, and the Double-Extortion Defense

The way in was an old backup VPN device that had been left running at a North American subsidiary after newer units replaced it. From there the network was breached, data was stolen, and then ransomware encrypted systems (double extortion). Up to ~390,000 people's personal data was potentially exposed (no payment-card data). Capcom refused to pay, restored from backup, and disclosed transparently. Defend by decommissioning unused gear, patching edge devices, and covering both theft and encryption (segmentation, detection, backups).