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CVE-2026-116779 — FreeSWITCH SIP MESSAGE handling lets attackers run API and OS commands: explainer and fix (fixed in 1.11.3, exploited in the wild, in KEV)

CVE-2026-116779 lets inbound SIP MESSAGE in FreeSWITCH 1.11.2 and earlier run commands (CVSS 9.8). Exploited in the wild; in CISA KEV. Fixed in 1.11.3.

Published 2026-11-10 Updated 2026-11-10 Last verified 2026-11-10 8 min read
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An explainer for a vulnerability in FreeSWITCH (open-source software used in IP telephony switches and contact-centre call platforms) that lets SIP MESSAGE handling run administrative commands. It is written for people who operate IP telephony, contact centres and call infrastructure, and covers impact and response from the defender's side without attack steps.

Advisory summary — ADVISORY / KEV
CVE
CVE-2026-116779 (GitHub advisory GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p)
Severity
CVSS v3.1 9.8 (Critical; vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N; assigned by GitHub)
Type
Command injection (CWE-77, CWE-78); exposed dangerous method (CWE-749)
Preconditions
Advisory: being able to send a SIP MESSAGE the profile accepts. CVE record: any authenticated account is sufficient (some configurations remove the authentication barrier)
Affected
SignalWire FreeSWITCH 1.11.2 and earlier
Fix
FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 or later (the new setting is off by default)
Dates
Advisory: 28 October 2026 / CVE record: 5 November 2026
Exploitation
The advisory states observed in the wild. Added to CISA KEV on 9 November (due 12 November)
9.8
CVSS v3.1
Exploited
Advisory: observed in the wild
1.11.3
Fixed version
12 Nov
KEV due date

Risk of waiting

FreeSWITCH runs as a daemon, and per the advisory OS commands run with its privileges. Its configuration often holds SIP account, trunk and management-connection credentials, so a leak reaches beyond the telephony platform. Calls can also be controlled; in this site's assessment, that could lead to charges from fraudulent outbound calls.

What the vulnerability is

Per the advisory, FreeSWITCH's handling of inbound SIP MESSAGE (text messages) chose a chat type from how the message was addressed. Selecting one of those types ran FreeSWITCH's administrative API, so API commands, including ones that run OS commands, execute with the daemon's privileges. This site does not describe the shape of the message or how the selection is made.

The advisory says inbound chat is enabled on the stock internal and external profiles. In other words, you can be affected without any special configuration.

Before (1.11.2 and earlier)

  • An accepted SIP MESSAGE can reach the administrative API
  • Inbound chat is on in the stock profiles
  • Having an authenticated account is enough to run it

Changes in 1.11.3 and later

  • Selecting the API becomes a per-profile setting (enable-chat-api-proto)
  • That setting is off unless set explicitly
  • Profiles that do not need chat can stop receiving it with enable-chat

Who is affected

ItemDetail
ProductSignalWire FreeSWITCH
Affected versions1.11.2 and earlier (CVE record wording: before 1.11.3)
Fixed version1.11.3 or later
Fully closes the pathenable-chat set to false on the relevant profile
Mitigation onlyMESSAGE authentication (auth-messages, on by default since 1.10.7); removing directory users without a password
Does not close itdisable_system_api_commands set to true (removes only the system API)
  • A directory user with no password (the advisory cites the default user in the conf/vanilla directory as an example) removes the authentication barrier. Authentication is not enforced for that user unless allow-empty-password is set to false.
  • IP-PBX and call-platform products that embed FreeSWITCH may ship the fix under their own version numbers. Ask your provider.

How to check whether you are affected

1

Check your FreeSWITCH version

Check the running version (for example with the version command in fs_cli) or the version of the package or container. 1.11.2 or earlier is affected. If you have several switches (production, staging, development, one per site), check each one (asset inventory checklist).

2

Check whether SIP listeners are exposed

Check whether the Sofia profiles (internal, external and others) can be reached from the internet or any other untrusted network. Include ports opened for trunks and remote workers' endpoints.

3

Check the chat settings

Look at enable-chat and auth-messages on each profile. The advisory says inbound chat is on in the stock internal and external profiles. Also note which profiles actually use chat.

What to do today

1

Update to 1.11.3 or later (top priority)

Update FreeSWITCH to 1.11.3 or later. The KEV due date is 12 November. If it is embedded in a product, apply your provider's fixed release.

2

Set enable-chat to false on profiles that do not use chat

The advisory lists enable-chat set to false on every profile that does not need inbound SIP chat as the only measure that fully closes the path. Make this the top interim measure until you can update, and keep unused profiles disabled afterwards.

3

Strengthen authentication and narrow reach (mitigation)

Enable auth-messages and remove directory users that have no password or a1-hash. As this site's own addition, limit the source addresses that can reach the SIP listeners to your trunks and the endpoints that need them. These only reduce who can attack; they do not close the path.

4

Check whether you have already been compromised

Because exploitation has been observed, for the period before the update look for unexpected inbound SIP MESSAGEs, unexpected outbound calls or a spike in call charges, and unexpected processes or changes to configuration files. KEV marks this entry for forensic triage. The vulnerability remediation playbook covers the process.

5

Rotate credentials if in doubt

The advisory says configuration and credentials can be disclosed. If you find suspicious signs, rotate SIP account passwords, trunk credentials and management-connection passwords, and talk to your carrier.

Exploitation status

  • The advisory and the CVE record both state that exploitation of this path has been observed in the wild.
  • CISA added it to KEV on 9 November 2026 with a due date of 12 November (KEV catalogue version 2026.11.09).
  • KEV records ransomware use as Unknown and forensic triage as Yes.
  • CISA's assessment (exploitation active, automatable, total technical impact) has been added to the CVE record.
  • NVD's status is Analyzed.
  • Public information on scale, actors or the number of victims could not be confirmed.

This site's view: prefer the setting that stops receipt over mitigations

Reasoning "we require authentication, so we are fine" is risky, for two reasons.

First, the advisory states that authentication is only a mitigation, and one stolen authenticated account gives the same result. Second, many switches do not use chat at all, and for those, setting enable-chat to false costs nothing in operations. A change with no business impact that closes the path itself should come first, together with the update (prioritising with CVSS, EPSS and KEV).

Sources

Last verified: 10 November 2026.

FAQ

QWhat is CVE-2026-116779?
A

A vulnerability in SignalWire FreeSWITCH 1.11.2 and earlier. According to the advisory, the handling of inbound SIP MESSAGE (text messages sent over SIP) has a path that reaches FreeSWITCH API commands, which extends to running OS commands. Configuration and credentials can be disclosed and calls controlled. The CVSS v3.1 score is 9.8.

QWhich versions are affected, and what is the fixed version?
A

The advisory lists 1.11.2 and earlier as affected and 1.11.3 or later as fixed. The fix turns the ability to select the API from chat into a per-profile setting (enable-chat-api-proto) that is off unless set explicitly. If FreeSWITCH is embedded in a product or distribution you use, check whether your provider has picked up the fix.

QIs there a workaround if I cannot update yet?
A

The only measure the advisory lists as fully closing the path is setting enable-chat to false on every profile that does not need inbound SIP chat. Message authentication (auth-messages, on by default since 1.10.7) plus removing directory users that have no password only narrows attackers to authenticated ones and does not close the path. Setting disable_system_api_commands to true removes only the system API, and the advisory says it does not close this path.

QAm I safe if I require authentication?
A

No. The advisory describes it as available to a peer whose MESSAGE is accepted. The CVE record says any authenticated profile account is sufficient, and that stock directory users without password material can remove that barrier in some configurations. Authentication is a mitigation, not a fix.

QIs it being exploited?
A

Yes. The GitHub advisory and the CVE record both state that exploitation of this path has been observed in the wild. CISA also added it to KEV on 9 November 2026 (due 12 November). KEV records ransomware use as Unknown. Public information on scale and actors could not be confirmed.

QWhat if FreeSWITCH runs inside another product?
A

KEV's note says the flaw affects an open-source component that could be used by different products. Ask your provider whether FreeSWITCH runs inside your IP-PBX, contact-centre software or telephony platform.