Live threat picture: attacks, exploited vulnerabilities and breaches
Attack volume, vulnerabilities confirmed as exploited, and disclosed breaches. Three public data sources on one page, so you can see what to put first in your own defenses.
Generated 2026-11-22 13:40 (UTC)
Key points
- 9 vulnerabilities were newly confirmed as exploited this week. If any is in a product you run, patch it before your other updates.
- Of the 22 breaches added in the last 90 days, 2 included passwords. Most exposed email addresses, names and phone numbers, which are used for scam emails and texts. Do not sign in through links in messages you receive.
- Attack volume swings a lot from day to day. If you run a site, the practical step is to have something that can absorb a sudden spike, such as a CDN or WAF, set up in advance.
Attack volume, sources and targets
These are Cloudflare Radar graphs embedded as-is. Labels inside the graphs are in English and are updated by Cloudflare (last 7 days).
Network-layer (L3/L4) attack volume, worldwide
DDoS attacks that flood links and servers with traffic. The dotted line is the previous 7 days.
Source: Cloudflare Radar (CC BY 4.0)
Application-layer (L7) attack volume, worldwide
Attacks over HTTP, such as floods of requests to websites and apps.
Source: Cloudflare Radar (CC BY 4.0)
Application-layer (L7) attack volume, Japan
L7 attacks aimed at sites in Japan.
Source: Cloudflare Radar (CC BY 4.0)
Where attacks come from and where they go (L7)
Use Source / Target at the top right to switch. The map and the diagram show which locations send and receive the most attacks.
Source: Cloudflare Radar (CC BY 4.0)
Share of malicious email
Of the email Cloudflare processed, the share classified as malicious (phishing, malware and similar).
Source: Cloudflare Radar (CC BY 4.0)
Newly exploited vulnerabilities this week
Added to CISA KEV (the catalog of vulnerabilities known to be exploited) in the last 7 days. EPSS is the estimated probability that exploitation is observed within 30 days.
Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Apache Roller versions 4.0.0 through 6.1.4 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code. The XML-RPC endpoint accepts vendor extension types and deserializes them before authenticating the requester. This is the same vulnerability as CVE-2026-82384, which listed only Apache Roller 6.1.5 as affected. This issue is being actively exploited. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Roller 6.1.6 or later, which disables the extension types and rejects XML-RPC requests when the XML-RPC feature is disabled. Users who cannot upgrade right away should set "enabledForExtensions" to "false" in WEB-INF/web.xml, or remove the "/roller-services/xmlrpc" servlet mapping, and restart Roller. Disabling XML-RPC in the administration UI is not enough, because older versions deserialize the request before checking that setting.
VMware vCenter contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the VMware Directory Service. Affected versions: 9.1.x (fixed in 9.1.1.0200); 9.0.x (fixed in 9.0.2.0200); 8.0 (fixed in 8.0 U3m); 5.x (fixed in 5.2.5). Telco Cloud Platform 3.0, 4.x, 5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2 and Telco Cloud Infrastructure 3.0 are also affected (see KB463116).
A vulnerability in the database service feature of Cisco Expressway Series could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker with network access to a Cisco Expressway device to execute arbitrary operating system commands as root. This vulnerability is due to the use of persistent cookies. Additionally, there is insufficient validation of client certificates when the TLS Verify Mode is set to Enabled for clustering, which means that client certificates are not validated. An attacker with possession of the cookies could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the database service and invoking specific remote procedure call (RPC) commands. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root on the underlying operating system of an affected device. Note: Cisco Expressway Series refers to Cisco Expressway Core (Expressway-C) devices and Cisco Expressway Edge (Expressway-E) devices.
SAP NetWeaver Enterprise Portal allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject JNDI environment properties or pass a URL used during JNDI lookup operations, enabling access to an unintended JNDI provider.�This could further lead to disclosure or modification of information about the server. There is no impact on availability.
LiteLLM through 2026-04-08 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via bytecode rewriting at the /guardrails/test_custom_code URI.
An unauthenticated Remote Code Execution vulnerability was found in the survey passthrough routing and Data Import processing logic, in which a malicious user could potentially exploit it by manipulating HTTP requests to access an unintended controller route from a public survey context and by supplying a crafted file-path/stream parameter during import handling. If successfully exploited, this could allow the attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code on the REDCap server. The attacker does not have to be authenticated in order to exploit this, but exploitation requires knowledge of a valid public survey hash. This vulnerability exists in REDCap 13.3.0 and higher.
** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** Deserialization of an inbound SOAP fault in Apache Axis 1.x allows unauthenticated remote class instantiation. When a SOAP <Fault> carries a <detail><exceptionName> element, Axis loads the named class and, if a String <data> element is also present, instantiates it through its String constructor before checking that it is an AxisFault. Loading alone runs the class's static initializer. With a suitable class on the application's classpath this leads to remote code execution. The fault is parsed while the engine resolves the target service, before any per-service handler chain runs, so authentication handlers configured on a service do not protect against it. This affects all Apache Axis 1.x versions through 1.4. As Axis 1 has been EOL we recommend you migrate to a different SOAP engine, such as Apache Axis 2/Java. Alternatively you could use a build of Axis with the patch from https://github.com/apache/axis-axis1-java/commit/41f3b4e8d04e310ca81f86b92630ab2c11d608bd applied. The Apache Axis project does not expect to create an Axis 1.x release fixing this problem.
Improper encoding or escaping of output vulnerability in the system plugin daemon in Synology BeeStation OS (BSM) before 1.1-65374 and Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) before 7.2-64570-4, 7.2.1-69057-6 and 7.2.2-72806-1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Added to KEV: 2026-11-18Look up →Deserialization of untrusted data in the report-processing code of Puppet, as used by Puppet Server, in the affected releases, allows a client that holds any CA-signed agent certificate to execute arbitrary code on the Puppet Server as its service user by submitting a report containing a crafted rich-data type via PUT request. Where the certificate authority autosigns requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated network attacker can obtain such a certificate.
Recently disclosed breaches (worldwide)
Two data sets, shown separately: this site's incident log, built from organisations' own notices, and totals from breaches added to Have I Been Pwned.
This site's incident log (last 30 days)
No incidents were logged in the last 30 days.
Only incidents confirmed by the organisation, a regulator or reputable reporting are logged. This is not a complete list of all breaches.
See all 2026 incidents →Breaches added to Have I Been Pwned
- Of 22 breaches in the last 90 days, 2 included passwords
- Median time from breach to listing: about 55 days
Data most often included (last 90 days, number of breaches)
- Email addresses22
- Names18
- Phone numbers17
- Physical addresses13
- Employers9
- Dates of birth8
- Job titles8
- Genders5
Organisation names are not shown: a listing on Have I Been Pwned is not necessarily the organisation's own disclosure. Spam lists, malware/stealer-log data and breaches judged fabricated are excluded.
Breach totals: Have I Been Pwned (CC BY 4.0). Totals are computed by this site.
How to read this page, and its limits
- The Cloudflare graphs count only attacks that Cloudflare's network detected and mitigated. They are not the attack volume of the whole internet.
- A "source" country is where the attack traffic came from. The attacker is not necessarily there: hijacked devices and rented cloud servers are often used.
- CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities for which the US CISA has evidence of exploitation. Not being listed does not mean safe.
- Breach numbers include only disclosed breaches. Disclosure can take weeks or months after the breach.
Sources and licences
- Attack graphs: Cloudflare Radar (CC BY 4.0). The embedded graphs collect usage metrics with Cloudflare Web Analytics (privacy policy).
- Exploited vulnerabilities: CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (CC0 1.0).
- Exploit probability: FIRST EPSS. See EPSS at https://www.first.org/epss
- Breach totals: Have I Been Pwned (CC BY 4.0). Totals are computed by this site. Have I Been Pwned data is refreshed at most every 12 hours (retrieved 2026-11-22 05:55 UTC).
- Incident log: recorded by this site from organisations' notices, regulators and reporting (all 2026 incidents).
For what each dataset is used for and its full licence terms, see Data sources and licences.