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Denmark CPR register misuse (about 8.8 million people): what was taken, and what residents and organisations that grant lookup access should do

Misuse of a private company's lookup access to Denmark's CPR register exposed names, addresses and CPR numbers of about 8.8 million people. What to do.

Published 2026-10-06 Updated 2026-10-12 Last verified 2026-10-12 17 min read
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For: people who live or have lived in Denmark and their families, and organisations that let outside businesses look up resident or customer data through an API or lookup screen. This article is based on the Danish government's official notice and does not cover attack techniques.

Developing: this article will be updated as the government publishes more

Who is affected

people who live or have lived in Denmark and their families, and organisations that let outside businesses look up resident or customer data through an API or lookup screen.

Not yet confirmed
  • How the lookup access was misused (official account)
  • Who is behind it
  • A way to check individually whether you are affected
2 more
  • Whether CPR numbers need to be changed
  • Findings of the CPR security review
What to do nowSee the steps ↓
  1. Prepare as if you are affected
  2. Never share MitID details or one-time codes
  3. Do not tap links in texts or emails; go to the official site yourself
2 more
  1. If you suspect misuse, set a credit warning
  2. If you need help, call the Cyberhotline
Last checked
As of October 12, 2026
Follow-up plans and what we checked

In its notice of October 5, the Danish government said the figures and details may change as the investigation continues. The password and access period reported from October 9 onward have not been confirmed in the government's statements, so this article shows them separately as media reports.

What residents (and former residents) should do today

1

Prepare as if you are affected

According to the ministry, about 8.8 million of the roughly 11 million registered people are affected, including emigrated and deceased persons. As of October 6, no way to check individually has been announced.

If you studied or worked in Denmark in the past, you may be affected if you were given a CPR number. Also watch for messages that use the name of a family member who has died.

2

Never share MitID details or one-time codes

The government security site sikkerdigital.dk asks people never to share MitID details, one-time codes, passwords or card details.

The ministry also reminds people not to give out passwords or similar by phone or email, even if the other person appears to know their name, address and CPR number. Those exact three items were taken, so a caller who knows them has proved nothing.

3

Do not tap links in texts or emails; go to the official site yourself

sikkerdigital.dk advises that if you receive an unexpected text or email with a link, you should not click it, and instead go to the official website yourself or call the sender's main number to double-check.

If someone calls you, hang up and call back on a number you looked up on the official site. The more a message rushes you, the more reason to doubt it (how to spot it: what is phishing).

4

If you suspect misuse, set a credit warning

According to sikkerdigital.dk, if you have a concrete suspicion that your CPR number is being used for fraud, you can set a credit warning (kreditadvarsel) on borger.dk. It is a marker in the CPR that makes it harder to take out loans or credit in your name.

According to borger.dk, you must be at least 15. The marker is registered in the CPR right away, but it can take a few days before it takes effect in companies' systems. It also makes borrowing harder for you, so you can remove it before applying for credit. If you cannot do it online, your municipality's citizen service can help (by appointment).

5

If you need help, call the Cyberhotline

The national Cyberhotline for digital security is +45 33 37 00 37. According to the ministry and sikkerdigital.dk, it is open 8 a.m. to midnight in the coming days.

If you reuse passwords across services, take this chance to separate them (how to check: how to check if your password was leaked; how to manage them: choosing a password manager).

What happened (from the Danish government's notice)

On October 5, 2026, Denmark's Ministry of Research, Education and Digitalisation published "Omfattende uautoriseret adgang til borgeres CPR-oplysninger" (extensive unauthorized access to citizens' CPR data). The same text is posted on the CPR's official website. Everything below is based on the ministry's notice.

  1. During September 2026

    There was irregular activity in the CPR system (the notice's fact box).
  2. Friday, October 2, evening

    The CPR administration became aware of that activity.
  3. October 3–4 (weekend)

    The administration learned that unauthorized persons had obtained names, addresses and CPR numbers of about 8.8 million people.
  4. October 5

    The ministry announced the incident, and sikkerdigital.dk posted advice for residents. The minister says she informed the parliamentary committee.
  5. October 6

    sikkerdigital.dk posted guidance for businesses and authorities that are contacted by citizens, asking them to review identity checks.
  6. Friday, October 9

    The CPR administration sends the 1,039 companies with lookup access a letter tightening its security rules (reported by DR). The same day, media report that the password "123456" was used at the company whose access was misused (not confirmed by the government).
  7. Saturday, October 10

    The minister sends a memo to two parliamentary committees (reported by DR).
~8.8M
Registered people whose name, address, CPR number and more were obtained
~11M
Total people in the CPR (including deceased and emigrated)
Stopped
The misused private company's lookup access
Early stage
Police investigation; who is behind it is unknown
What was obtained and how (from the Danish government's notice)
Who
About 8.8 million registered people, including living, emigrated and deceased persons
Items
Names, addresses, CPR numbers and more, within the data private companies are allowed to look up
Not included
Names and addresses of people registered with name and address protection (navne- og adressebeskyttelse)
How
Unauthorized persons misused a private Danish company's legitimate access to look up data in the CPR
Company name
Not disclosed in the notice
Response
The company's access was stopped; the Danish Data Protection Agency was notified; police are investigating with relevant authorities; measures to prevent similar incidents have started, and a thorough security review of the CPR is under way
Open points
The investigation is at an early stage and it is not known who is behind it. The ministry itself warns that further mapping may change the details
Help
sikkerdigital.dk, Cyberhotline +45 33 37 00 37 (8 a.m. to midnight for now)

Reported, but not in the ministry's notice

The points below have been reported in the media but do not appear in the ministry's notice of October 5. This article does not treat them as established, and will be updated if the government publishes details.

  • The password "123456": according to findings by the Danish daily Politiken, distributed by the news agency Ritzau (published by DR), at least three accounts at the company whose access was misused used this password, one of them an administrator account.
  • How long the access was available: according to the public broadcaster DR, the lookup access was available for 21 days and 17 hours. According to the CPR administration's report to the Data Protection Agency, however, it was not used throughout that period.
  • How the lookups were made: The Hacker News, a security news site, reports, citing the Danish news agency and the Data Protection Agency, that they consisted of a very large number of automated lookups.

Letter to the 1,039 companies with lookup access (reported by DR)

According to DR, the minister's memo sent to two parliamentary committees on October 10 says that on October 9 the CPR administration sent the 1,039 companies with lookup access a letter tightening its security rules. The main points:

  • Companies with access must have a security officer
  • They must continuously review employees' access to register data
  • They must follow their monthly number of CPR lookups to check that the access is not being misused

DR also reports that the minister has acknowledged that security around the system was not good enough, and has asked for a security review. This site could not consult the memo itself on the Danish parliament's website, so it is presented here as DR's report.

Why private companies can look up the CPR at all

The ministry's notice includes a fact box on private companies' access. Under section 38 of the CPR Act, private companies with a legitimate interest may receive CPR data about people they have already identified one by one, using the CPR number, date of birth and name, or name and address.

In addition, the company must be entitled to receive the data under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Danish Data Protection Act. Section 38(2) of the CPR Act sets out which data such companies generally have access to.

In other words, what was used was not a back door but a lawful entrance granted to companies. Defences that stop intruders do not stop lookups that arrive with valid credentials.

A private company's account with lookup access

used by unauthorized persons

↓

CPR lookup service

valid access, so sign-in succeeds

↓

Results for about 8.8 million people

items private companies may look up

Where to notice: not at sign-in, but in how the access is used

per-client volume, deviation from normal, share of numbers not found, volume versus client size

Where misuse of legitimate lookup access can be noticed (layout based on the ministry's notice; how the access was misused has not been disclosed)

What organisations that grant lookup APIs should check

This section is for organisations that let contracted businesses look up resident, customer or credit data through an API or lookup screen. Because the cause has not been disclosed, it covers points that apply to any service built this way.

How to design limits in general (who to count, what to count, what to do at the limit) is covered in rate limiting and abuse control. Signs of inhumanly fast activity, such as from AI agents, are covered in the DIVD case. Here we add what is specific to a legitimate client's access.

1

Give each client a limit that matches its declared customer base

Under the Danish rules, a company may look up people it has already identified one by one. So the number of people a client looks up in a month should not greatly exceed its number of customers.

As a first step, set daily and monthly lookup limits per client based on the customer count declared at contract time. Alert the account owner at 80% of the limit, and at the limit stop lookups and ask the client for the reason.

2

Watch deviation from normal and the share of numbers not found, daily

Absolute volume alone will not reveal anomalies at a client that is large to begin with. Use each client's average daily volume over the past 30 days as a baseline, and alert on days that exceed it several times over.

Another signal is the share of lookups that return no match. A client looking up its own customers should find almost all of them. A client whose not-found rate suddenly rises may be looking up people who are not its customers, so check with it at once.

3

Leave no guessable passwords on administrator and shared accounts

In this case, at least three accounts at the company with lookup access, including an administrator account, reportedly used the password "123456" (not confirmed by the government). A single compromised account with lookup rights reaches data on many people.

As a first step, ask each client for a list of its administrator accounts and accounts shared by several people, and check that multi-factor authentication is on for each. On your side, review successful and failed logins and each account's lookup count every month, and flag accounts whose volume is above normal. The monthly lookup-count check the CPR administration has asked of the 1,039 companies follows the same idea.

4

Do not leave client account security to the client

When legitimate access is used by someone else, checking IDs and passwords does not help. Require, as a contract condition, multi-factor authentication, restrictions on source IP addresses, and regular rotation of API keys for lookup accounts (background: authentication vs. authorization, choosing two-factor authentication).

Also review once a year whether any client holds access that is unusually broad for its size, or access it no longer uses.

5

Record who looked up whom and when, and be able to cut access at once

For every lookup, record the client, the user, the time and the person looked up. A reasonable minimum retention is 12 months (the period the card industry standard PCI DSS requires for audit logs). Without these records you cannot answer whose data went out.

In this case the CPR administration stopped the company's access. For each client, decide the procedure and the person who can cut its access immediately without affecting other clients.

For businesses and authorities contacted by residents: review identity checks

On October 6, sikkerdigital.dk asked businesses and authorities that are contacted by citizens to reconsider whether name, address and CPR number are still enough if they have used them to verify callers. The methods it lists are below.

No longer proof of identity after this incident

  • CPR number
  • Name
  • Address
  • Date of birth

Checks listed by sikkerdigital.dk

  • Ask the person to sign in to self-service, for example with MitID
  • Send a one-time code to a phone number or email already on file
  • Call back on a number already on file
  • Ask about things specific to the relationship, such as a customer number or latest invoice number

The site says that for requests such as access to personal data, changes of contact details, new subscriptions, purchases on credit, new SIM cards, password resets or changes of payment details, strong verification should be used, and CPR number, name, address or date of birth should not be enough. It also suggests manual checks or a waiting period for changes with financial or security impact.

For readers in Japan: how My Number differs, and the lesson that still applies

According to Japan's Digital Agency, Japan's My Number is used for procedures set out in laws or ordinances, such as social security, tax and disaster response, and providing it for other purposes is in principle restricted. The agency also says that the number alone cannot be used to complete procedures (Digital Agency My Number FAQ, Japanese).

Despite the different systems, the lesson carries over directly: do not use numbers or addresses that many people can know as a password for identity. Businesses whose phone desks accept requests on name, address and date of birth alone should add a call-back to the number on file or a question specific to the relationship.

Sources (public record)

The facts in this article are based on the public information below. It does not cover the name of the company whose access was misused, who is behind the incident, or techniques that have not been disclosed. Points based on media reports are marked as such in the text.

  • Danish Ministry of Research, Education and Digitalisation, "Omfattende uautoriseret adgang til borgeres CPR-oplysninger" (October 5, 2026, Danish; URL updated on October 12 after the ministry's site moved) — fudm.dk
  • CPR (Det Centrale Personregister), same notice (Danish) — cpr.dk
  • sikkerdigital.dk, advice for citizens (October 5, 2026, Danish) — sikkerdigital.dk
  • sikkerdigital.dk, guidance on verifying citizens for businesses and authorities (October 6, 2026, Danish) — sikkerdigital.dk
  • borger.dk, "Kreditadvarsel" (Danish) — borger.dk
  • Japan Digital Agency, My Number FAQ (Q1-4, Q1-7; Japanese) — digital.go.jp
  • The Hacker News (October 2026, news report; its statements on the duration and method are not confirmed in the ministry's notice) — thehackernews.com
  • DR, "1039 virksomheder har fået indskærpet sikkerhed efter CPR-læk" (Ritzau; Danish. On the minister's memo sent Saturday, October 10, the letter to 1,039 companies sent Friday, October 9, the access period, and Politiken's findings on the password "123456" and at least three accounts, one an administrator account) — dr.dk
  • Ingeniøren, "Millioner af CPR-numre var beskyttet med adgangskoden 123456" (October 9, 2026; Danish. Reports an anonymous hacker telling Politiken that a very simple password was used; does not mention the number of accounts or an administrator account) — ing.dk

Update history

2026-10-12: Updated the ministry notice's URL to its new location (fudm.dk). Added the reported "123456" password and access period (not confirmed by the government), and the minister's memo as reported by DR (letter to 1,039 companies; acknowledgement that security was not good enough). Added a check of administrator and shared accounts for organisations that grant lookup APIs.
2026-10-06: First version, based on the Danish ministry's notice of October 5 and sikkerdigital.dk's guidance of October 5 and 6. The ministry says the investigation continues and details may change; this article will be updated when new facts are published.

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FAQ

QWhat was taken in the Danish CPR incident?
A

According to the Danish ministry's notice of October 5, 2026, unauthorized persons gained access to names, addresses, CPR numbers and more for about 8.8 million registered people, including living, emigrated and deceased persons. The CPR holds about 11 million people. The data accessed stayed within the information that private companies are allowed to look up.

QWas the CPR system itself hacked?
A

According to the ministry, a private company's legitimate access to look up data in the CPR was misused. The CPR administration has stopped the company's access and is mapping the course of events with specialists and authorities. As of October 6, how that access came to be misused had not been disclosed.

QCan I check whether I am affected?
A

As of October 6, neither the ministry's notice nor the government security site sikkerdigital.dk describes a way to check individually. Since about four in five registered people are affected, anyone who lives or has lived in Denmark should prepare as if they are.

QWhich scams should I watch for?
A

sikkerdigital.dk asks people to be especially alert to texts, calls and emails in which the sender uses information about them. The ministry reminds people never to give out passwords or other confidential information by phone or email, even if the other person appears to know their name, address and CPR number. Never share MitID details, one-time codes, passwords or card details.

QShould I set a credit warning (kreditadvarsel)?
A

sikkerdigital.dk says that if you have a concrete suspicion that your CPR number is being used for fraud, you can set a credit warning on borger.dk. It is a marker in the CPR that makes it harder to take out loans or credit in your name. According to borger.dk, you must be at least 15, it can take a few days to reach companies' systems, and it also makes it harder for you to borrow yourself.

QIs the cause or the culprit known?
A

The ministry says the investigation is at an early stage and it is not yet possible to say who is behind it. The case has been reported to the Danish Data Protection Agency and is being investigated by the police. The ministry's notice does not name the company whose access was misused. According to Danish media (findings by the daily Politiken, distributed by the news agency Ritzau), at least three accounts at that company used the password 123456, one of them an administrator account. As of October 12, this has not been confirmed in the government's statements.