For: customers of AXA General Insurance Japan (car, motorcycle, pet and other insurance) who use or used the MyAXA portal, and people who used its roadside assistance. This article is based on AXA General Insurance's official announcements and does not cover attack methods.
Developing: this article will be updated as the organisation publishes more
- Who is affected
customers of AXA General Insurance Japan (car, motorcycle, pet and other insurance) who use or used the MyAXA portal, and people who used its roadside assistance.
- Confirmed so farSee the table ↓
- Unauthorized access to MyAXA
- Detection and blocking times
Listed as possibly affected
- Number of records
- Name, address, birth date, email address, phone number
- Not yet confirmed
- Cause (how the access happened)
- Details of the scope
- Range and content affected at the roadside assistance partner
2 more
- When and how affected customers will be contacted
- Whether the data has been misused
- What to do nowSee the steps ↓
- Do not open links in emails or SMS posing as AXA or roadside assistance
- Never enter or give a password or verification code, whatever the reason
- Check through the official website you open yourself, or the phone line in the announcement
2 more
- Wait for the company's individual contact to learn whether you are affected
- If you reuse your password on other services, separate them
- Where to verify (source)All sources ↓
- AXA General Insurance, notice on unauthorized access to the customer portal MyAXA and to the roadside assistance outsourcing partner and the resulting leak of customer information, second report (Nov 13, 2026; in Japanese)
- Last checked
- As of November 17, 2026
Follow-up plans and what we checked
In its second report of November 13, AXA General Insurance says it is identifying affected customers and will contact them individually, in order, once confirmed. It will announce details on the partner promptly once known. As of November 17, we found no official announcement newer than the second report.
What customers should do today
Do not open links in emails or SMS posing as AXA or roadside assistance
What may have leaked is your name, address, birth date, email address and phone number. With those, a message can be made to look genuine, with the right name and address.
If a message arrives about "confirming your contract", "a problem with your premium payment", "re-registering personal data" or "confirming roadside assistance use", do not open the link in it. Open the app or official website yourself to check (how to spot these is in What is phishing). The same goes for fake notices by SMS.
Never enter or give a password or verification code, whatever the reason
In its first report the company asks customers not to access suspicious links and not to enter or provide passwords or verification codes. If anyone asks for a verification code by phone or reply, treat that alone as a sign it is fake.
Even if the other party gets your name, address and birth date right, that is not proof. That is exactly the information that may have leaked.
Check through the official website you open yourself, or the phone line in the announcement
In its second report, the company lists a contact line for MyAXA (0120-999-935; weekdays 9:00-18:00, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays 9:00-17:00, excluding the year-end holidays) and one for roadside assistance (0120-975-986; weekdays 9:00-17:00, excluding the year-end holidays). Use these numbers from the official announcement, not a number written in a message you received.
Wait for the company's individual contact to learn whether you are affected
The company says it will contact affected customers individually, in order, once confirmed. The announcement does not say how (email, post and so on). To avoid fakes posing as that contact, confirm the same notice on the official website you open yourself, whatever the channel.
If you reuse your password on other services, separate them
The company's announcement does not say whether passwords leaked, so we cannot say you must change yours now. If you use the same password as MyAXA on other services, separating them now limits the damage from future incidents (this is this site's general advice, not the company's guidance). A password manager makes this practical.
What happened (from AXA General Insurance's announcements)
AXA General Insurance Co., Ltd. published a first report on November 12, 2026 and a second report on November 13. What follows is based on those announcements. The roadside assistance partner case had a separate notice (first report) on November 2.
October 29, 2026
The roadside assistance partner detected unauthorized access by a third party to its system (per the second report).November 2
The company was told that part of its customers' information held by the partner had been taken outside (per the second report). The same day it published its first notice on the partner case.Monday, November 9, about 8:30 a.m.
The company noticed suspicious access to MyAXA. It took measures including blocking access at 10:53 a.m.Thursday, November 12
After confirming safety, it restored MyAXA. The same day it published a first report on the MyAXA unauthorized access.Friday, November 13
Second report published. It gave the number of records and the items, and combined MyAXA and the roadside assistance partner in one notice.
What changed between the first and second reports
- Known in the first report
- A third party had gained unauthorized access to MyAXA. Related web services were suspended and then restored after safety was confirmed. The path and scope were under investigation. Customers were asked not to open suspicious links or enter passwords or verification codes
- Added in the second report
- The number (about 597,000), the items (name, address, birth date, email address, phone number), that credit card information is not included, the November 9 detection and blocking times, the roadside assistance partner's October 29 detection and the November 2 report, that no misuse or secondary harm is confirmed, and that affected customers will be contacted individually in order
- Still unknown
- The cause, details of the scope, and the range of customers and information possibly affected at the roadside assistance partner
- Services involved
- The customer portal MyAXA, and an outsourcing partner that handles part of the roadside assistance work
- MyAXA number
- About 597,000 records (records that may have been accessed)
- Customer information that may have leaked (MyAXA)
- Name, address, birth date, email address, phone number. Credit card information is not included
- Roadside assistance partner
- The company is investigating, with the partner, the range of customers and the information possibly affected
- Response
- Blocked access, took needed security measures, strengthened monitoring, investigating the cause and scope, stopped customer-data transfers from the company to the partner and contained the issue, reported to and coordinated with the authorities
- Service status
- MyAXA was restored on November 12. Some web functions of the roadside assistance run by the partner remain suspended. Roadside assistance continues to be taken and arranged by phone and substitute operations
- Harm
- No misuse of information or secondary harm has been confirmed so far (second report)
What is known and what is not
Status as of November 17, 2026 (reflecting the second report of November 13). This table will be updated when the company publishes more.
| Item | What has been announced | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthorized access to MyAXA | A third party accessed customer information it had no authority to access | Leak confirmed (company) |
| Detection and blocking times | Noticed at about 8:30 a.m. on November 9; access blocked at 10:53 a.m. | Confirmed (company) |
| Number of records | About 597,000 (records that may have been accessed) | Possible (company) |
| Name, address, birth date, email address, phone number | Customer information that may have leaked | Possible (company) |
| Credit card information | Not included in the MyAXA items | Not included (company) |
| Passwords and contract details | Not listed in the announced items | Not stated |
| Misuse or secondary harm | Not confirmed so far | Not confirmed (company) |
| Roadside assistance partner: range and content | Under detailed investigation | Under investigation |
| Cause and scope | Investigation continues | Under investigation |
| Contact to affected customers | Individually, in order, once confirmed | Planned (company) |
Name + address + birth date + email + phone
↓→
A fake message posing as the insurer, with the right name and address
→ Do not open links / check on the official site or phone line
Credit card information is not included (company)
What names, addresses, birth dates and contact details can be used for
In general, this combination is useful to scammers for the reasons below. This describes what such items make possible, not something reported to have happened here.
- A matching name and address make a message look like it came from the insurer or its partner
- A birth date is sometimes used for identity checks by phone, so someone who knows it can pose as you more easily
- With an email address and phone number, someone can reach you by email, SMS or phone directly
- Contract renewal, premium payments and accident handling are easy pretexts for pressing you to act
If your car insurance renewal is near, compare any "renewal procedure needed" message with the contract details on the official site you open yourself.
How to read it: no misuse confirmed does not mean safe from now on
As of the second report, the company says no misuse of the information or secondary harm has been confirmed. That means nothing has been found so far; it does not mean the data will not be used later. Birth dates and phone numbers are hard to change, so stay alert even after some time has passed.
For people who run insurance or member-facing information services
The cause has not been published, so we do not guess at methods or priorities. Two points follow from the announced sequence of events alone.
Check your own screens and the data you hand to partners separately
The company confirmed unauthorized access in MyAXA (its own screen) and at the roadside assistance partner (external) at different times. The November 9 case was detected and blocked by the company; the partner detected its case on October 29.
If you keep track of customer data in two parts, what sits in your own systems and what you pass to partners, you can explain much faster "which case" and "how many" when an incident occurs.
Be able to stop customer-data transfers to partners
One of the company's responses is stopping customer-data transfers from the company to the partner. Whether you can stop a transfer from your side quickly decides how much new data goes out when a partner has an incident. Decide in advance how to stop transfers and who makes that call.
Sources (public record)
This article's facts rest on the public information below. We do not speculate about unpublished causes or intrusion methods.
- AXA General Insurance, notice on unauthorized access to the customer portal MyAXA and to the roadside assistance outsourcing partner and the resulting leak of customer information, second report (Nov 13, 2026; in Japanese) — axa-direct.co.jp
- AXA General Insurance, notice on unauthorized access to MyAXA, first report (Nov 12, 2026; in Japanese) — axa-direct.co.jp
- AXA General Insurance, notice on unauthorized access to the roadside assistance partner, first report (Nov 2, 2026; shown as last updated Nov 10; in Japanese) — axa-direct.co.jp
Update history
2026-11-17: First version. Based on AXA General Insurance's first report (Nov 12) and second report (Nov 13). The second report gave the number and items; the cause, the scope and the range and content at the roadside assistance partner are under investigation, and this article will be updated when they are published.
Read next
- Another insurer, same period: Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance: unauthorized access to its policyholder page and MS Compass
- A separate case in the same period (unauthorized access at a roadside assistance partner, affecting several insurers and leasing companies, including this one): Unauthorized access to a roadside assistance reception system
- Guarding against follow-on scams: What is phishing / Smartphone security basics
- Passwords: Choosing a password manager / How to check if your password leaked
- Other cases at vendors and service providers in the same period: GoQSystem unauthorized access (about 4.37 million people) / Unauthorized access to a LINE messaging tool provider
- Other 2026 incidents: Data breaches and cyberattacks in 2026 (Japan and overseas)