For: people with a Daiwa Securities account who have contacted the company online, and businesses that use outside services to handle customer inquiries. This article is based on the official notice from Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. and the notices from the vendor and from other companies that use the same vendor's service (Citizen Watch, Sompo Japan, ORIX Life Insurance, Tobu Railway and au Jibun Bank), and does not cover attack techniques.
What customers should do today
Check whether you are affected in your message box
According to the company's website, affected customers were contacted individually on October 5 through the message box (お知らせBOX) in online trading. Sign in yourself from a bookmark or the official app, not from a link in an email, and check there.
If you are unsure, call the dedicated line (0120-851850, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Japan time, closed weekends and holidays). Use the number published on the company's official site, not one given in a message you received.
Never log in from links in emails or texts
What may have leaked is your name, email address, account number and the content of your inquiries. Together, these make it possible to write a fake message with the right name, the right account number, and a reference to your past inquiry.
The company's phishing page tells customers not to log in to online trading from emails. Even if a message talks about a security check, an apology or compensation, do not open the link; sign in from your usual bookmark or the official app (how to spot fakes: What is phishing?).
Never give anyone your ID, password, PIN or one-time passwords
The company asks customers not to give their trading ID, password, PIN or one-time passwords in response to suspicious messages. The same applies if a caller says it is "to confirm your identity".
A caller who knows your name and account number has not proved anything. That is exactly the information that may have leaked.
Sign in with a passkey, and check operation notifications
The company offers passkey sign-in to online trading, using a fingerprint or face recognition. A passkey only works on the real site, so it helps prevent the damage that follows from typing your ID and password into a fake site (how it works: What is a passkey?; compared with other methods: Choosing MFA the right way).
Also confirm that operation notifications are on. These emails arrive when someone signs in, trades, withdraws money or changes personal details. The company says it switched them on for, in principle, all customers from May 11, 2025.
Look through your operation history
After signing in to online trading, open the "お手続き・サポート" (procedures and support) menu and choose "操作履歴" (operation history) to see recent sign-ins and procedures.
If you see a sign-in, trade or change you did not make, change your password at once and contact the company. If you use the same password elsewhere, separate it there too (how to check: How to check if your password has leaked).
What happened (from Daiwa Securities' notice)
Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. published a notice on October 5, 2026 about the possible leak of customer information through unauthorized access to an outside vendor. Everything below is from that notice.
About 8:33 p.m., October 2 to 8:01 a.m., October 3, 2026
According to the vendor, unauthorized access to the vendor's server took place during this window.October 3
The vendor told the company it had found traces of access to and retrieval of the company's customer information.October 5
The company announced the incident and contacted affected customers individually through the online-trading message box.
- Where
- The server of the vendor providing the service the company uses to manage customers' online inquiries
- Scope
- Inquiry-related data for about 110,000 customers; about 220,000 records including inquiries that identify no one
- Items
- Name, email address, account number and other information from records of inquiries already received
- Accounts
- The company says this data cannot be used to access securities accounts or trade, including through online trading
- Company systems
- The access was only to the vendor's server; no unauthorized access to the company's systems was found
- Cause
- Not stated in the company's notice. The company says it will review the vendor's root-cause investigation (the vendor's account is in the next section)
- Vendor's response
- The vendor reported emergency security hardening and no further unauthorized access or leaks found so far
- Contact
- Dedicated line 0120-851850 (9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Japan time, closed weekends and holidays)
The vendor's notice, and other affected companies
On October 6, the vendor that provides the inquiry-management service and its parent company each published a notice. It shows the unauthorized access was not limited to Daiwa Securities: it reached the environments of several client companies running on the same server. The vendor's notice does not name the client companies.
- What happened
- From about 8:30 p.m. on October 2 to about 8:00 a.m. on October 3, a third party logged in to the service's management site without authorization and placed an unauthorized program on a server the vendor manages. Inquiry data may have been taken from the databases of client environments running on the same server
- Scope
- Inquiry data stored in client environments on the same server (up to five companies)
- Records
- Up to 713,126, counted per inquiry, so several inquiries from the same person are counted separately. The actual number of people is still being determined
- Items
- Name, email address, inquiry content and so on (items differ by client company)
- Detection
- An investigation began on the morning of October 3 after a database monitoring alert; the access was cut off at about 8:00 a.m. that day
- Response
- Changed the password of the account used for the unauthorized login, isolated the unauthorized program, changed admin passwords in all environments, and changed settings so uploaded files cannot run as programs, among other steps. A forensic investigation (looking for traces of the intrusion) is under way with outside specialists, and the incident has been reported to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission
- Planned measures
- Based on the investigation, stronger administrator authentication (including multi-factor authentication), separation between environments, stronger monitoring and regular third-party vulnerability assessments (vendor's notice)
- Secondary damage
- None found as of October 6
Since then, other client companies have published notices saying the same vendor reported the incident to them. These are the official notices this site could confirm as of October 10.
| Company (date) | Service involved | Count (as each company states it) | Its own data |
|---|---|---|---|
| Daiwa Securities (Oct 5) | Managing online inquiries | About 110,000 people (about 220,000 records) | May have leaked (company) |
| Citizen Watch (Oct 6) | Brand websites' contact forms | About 100,000 people (dedicated inquiry form available) | May have leaked (company) |
| Sompo Japan (Oct 7) | FAQ and inquiries for SMILING ROAD | About 60,000 records, counted per inquiry | May have leaked (company) |
| ORIX Life Insurance (Oct 8) | Managing inquiries from its website | About 26,500 records (including repeat inquiries) | May have leaked (company) |
| Tobu Railway (Oct 7) | Customer center contact form | Not stated | No sign of viewing or taking found (company) |
| au Jibun Bank (Oct 9) | FAQ and email contact form | Not stated | Not among the up-to-five environments; no leak found (company) |
Citizen Watch Co., Ltd. (October 6) announced that the same vendor had reported unauthorized access to the system it used for inquiries received through the contact forms on its websites.
- Scope: inquiries to the Citizen, Bulova and Frederique Constant brands, about 100,000 people
- Items: name, address, phone number, email address and so on. If customers wrote bank account or credit card information in the inquiry field, that may also have leaked
- Time window: about 8:33 p.m. on October 2 to 8:01 a.m. on October 3 (the same as in Daiwa's notice)
- The company says it will contact affected customers individually; no secondary damage had been found as of October 6
- Contact: the dedicated inquiry form listed in its notice (contact.citizen.co.jp, Japanese)
Sompo Japan Insurance Inc. (October 7) announced the incident for SMILING ROAD, its connected dashcam service for businesses, where it uses the same vendor's servers mainly for FAQ and inquiries from employees of client businesses.
- Count: about 60,000 records counted per inquiry (several inquiries from the same person are counted separately)
- Items: name, phone number, address, email address, employer details (company, department, industry, agency name and so on), driver ID, driving-alert data (type and time), device details (such as the dashcam's serial number), application number, and inquiry content (subject and body)
- Not included: bank account, credit card and My Number card information
- Time window: about 8:33 p.m. on October 2 to 8:01 a.m. on October 3 (the same as in Daiwa's notice)
- The company says it will contact affected customers individually and had found no misuse as of the notice. Its dedicated line is 0120-268-567 (weekdays 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Japan time)
ORIX Life Insurance Corporation (October 8) announced the incident for the same vendor's service, which it uses to manage inquiries received through its official website.
- Count: about 26,500 records (including repeat inquiries from the same customer)
- Items: name, date of birth, address, phone number, email address, policy number, and inquiry content (including medical information customers reported)
- Not included: information that could lead to financial loss, such as My Number (Japan's national ID number) or credit card numbers
- The company says it will contact affected customers individually by letter or email, and had found no secondary damage as of the notice. Its customer service center is 0120-330-053 (Monday to Friday, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Japan time)
Other companies that use the same vendor's service said no effect on their own data has been found.
- Tobu Railway Co., Ltd. (October 7): says it was notified by the provider of the service behind its customer center contact form, and that according to the vendor, the investigation so far has found no sign that information about Tobu was viewed or taken. As a precaution, it asks customers not to open links or attachments in suspicious emails
- au Jibun Bank Corporation (October 9): says it was notified by the provider of the service behind its FAQ and email contact form, that it is not among the up-to-five client environments the vendor announced, and that no sign of unauthorized data access or login and no leak of customer data has been found
The vendor says up to five companies are involved. As far as this site could confirm (as of October 10), four have announced that their customer data may have leaked: Daiwa Securities, Citizen Watch, Sompo Japan and ORIX Life Insurance. The remaining clients have not been named, and this article does not guess who they are.
Iwate Bank and Shikoku Bank have also posted notices passing Daiwa's announcement on to their own customers. Both do so as Daiwa's business partners; neither notice says the bank was itself a client of the vendor's service.
The counts use different units: the vendor, Sompo Japan and ORIX Life Insurance count every inquiry, Daiwa Securities gives both records and people, and Citizen Watch gives people. They cannot simply be added or subtracted.
Treat what you wrote in an inquiry as possibly leaked too
Daiwa's notice lists the items as "name, email address, account number and so on" and does not say how the text of inquiries is treated. The vendor's notice, on the other hand, lists inquiry content among the items.
If you remember writing a credit card number, bank account or date of birth in an inquiry, the safe course is to assume that may have leaked too (this site's view). For a card, call the issuer on the number on the back of the card and ask whether it should be reissued.
What the leaked data could be used for
None of these items is rare on its own, but together they make fake messages look real. What sets this case apart is that, beyond name and contact details, it includes account numbers and what customers asked about.
Name + email + account number
↓→
Fake sign-in requests with the right name and account number
→ Never log in from links / use a passkey
Name + past inquiry content
↓→
Fake calls or emails starting "About your recent inquiry…"
→ Never give a PIN or one-time password / call back on the official number
Not found, according to the notice
- Access to the company's own systems
- Fraudulent trades (as of October 5)
- Publication or spread of the data (as of October 5)
- Account access or trading with this data alone (the company says it is not possible)
May have leaked
- Name
- Email address
- Account number and other details
- Inquiry content (records of inquiries already received)
How to read it: 'this data cannot be used to trade' does not mean 'do nothing'
The company says the data that may have leaked is not enough on its own to access accounts or trade. That means this data alone is not enough.
If you type your ID and password into a fake email or site, it is a different story. Japan's Financial Services Agency has warned that fraudulent trades using login IDs and passwords stolen through fake sites posing as securities firms have been frequent (FSA warning, Japanese). Login details are the likely next target, so never logging in from links and using a passkey are the core defenses.
Inquiry content differs from person to person. If you remember what you asked about, you can tell when a message mentions that topic and suspect the leaked data is being used.
For businesses that use outside services for customer inquiries
The data was stored not in the company's own systems but on the server of a vendor used for inquiry management. The vendor says it started with an unauthorized login to the management site, but how that became possible has not been disclosed, so this section sticks to points that apply to any similar setup. A case where the help-desk system itself was the target of an intrusion is covered in the DIVD incident. Here we add what is specific to inquiry records.
Do not let inquiry forms collect account numbers as free text
In the message field of an inquiry form, customers often type account numbers, dates of birth, and sometimes even passwords. If identity checks are needed, have customers send inquiries from a signed-in screen, and do not store the numbers in inquiry records.
A first step is to detect strings shaped like account or phone numbers when a form is submitted and mask part of them before saving. Some inquiry-management services offer redaction of sensitive data or a way to process content before it is stored.
Set a retention period for closed inquiries and delete them when it ends
Once an inquiry is closed, its record is rarely used, but in a leak every record is exposed. Decide how long to keep old records and make them delete automatically when the period ends.
If a vendor stores them, set the retention period and deletion method in the contract and check at least once a year that deletion actually happens. A case where data was not deleted after a contract ended is in the ApplyNow entry of the 2026 incident list.
List the vendors holding customer data, with volumes and a notification deadline
List every outside service that holds customer or applicant data: inquiry management, email delivery, surveys, recruiting and so on. For each, write down how many records and which items it holds, and within how many hours it must tell you if it detects unauthorized access.
Starting with the vendors that hold the most records, check that their admin screens have multi-factor authentication, source restrictions and alerts on large exports (background: Authentication vs authorization).
Also ask whether your data sits on the same server as other customers' environments. In this case, the environments of up to five companies on one server were affected. If yours is shared, find out whether an intrusion on another customer's side could reach your data.
Sources (public record)
The facts in this article are based on the public information below. We do not speculate about undisclosed methods or causes.
- Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd., notice on the possible leak of customer information due to unauthorized access to an outside vendor (October 5, 2026, Japanese) — company disclosure (PDF)
- Daiwa Securities website notice (individual contact through the message box, Japanese) — daiwa.jp
- Daiwa Securities, phishing warning (Japanese) — daiwa.jp
- Daiwa Securities, security settings (passkeys, operation notifications, operation history; Japanese) — daiwa.jp
- [The vendor's parent company], apology and notice regarding a personal-information leak caused by unauthorized access at a consolidated subsidiary (当社連結子会社における不正アクセスによる個人情報漏えいに関するお詫びとお知らせ, October 6, 2026, Japanese) — notice by the vendor's parent company (PDF)
- [The vendor], apology and notice regarding a personal-information leak caused by unauthorized access to the FAQ system [the vendor's service] (October 6, 2026, Japanese) — notice by the vendor
- Citizen Watch Co., Ltd., notice on the possible leak of customer information due to unauthorized access to a contractor (委託先事業者に対する不正アクセスによるお客様情報の漏えいの可能性について, October 6, 2026, Japanese) — citizen.co.jp
- Sompo Japan Insurance Inc., notice on the possible leak of customer information due to unauthorized access to an outside vendor's system used for a business service (当社事業者向けサービスで使用する外部委託先システムへの不正アクセスによるお客さま情報漏えいの可能性について, October 7, 2026, Japanese) — sompo-japan.co.jp (PDF)
- ORIX Life Insurance Corporation, notice on a possible personal-information leak at a contractor (当社の委託先における個人情報漏えいの可能性について, October 8, 2026, Japanese) — orixlife.co.jp (PDF)
- Tobu Railway Co., Ltd., notice on unauthorized access to a contractor (委託先事業者への不正アクセスについて(お知らせ), October 7, 2026, Japanese) — tobu.co.jp (PDF)
- au Jibun Bank Corporation, notice on how the unauthorized-access incident at an FAQ system [the vendor's service] affects the bank (October 9, 2026, Japanese) — jibunbank.co.jp (PDF)
- Iwate Bank, Ltd., notice relaying Daiwa Securities' announcement to customers under its business alliance with Daiwa (Japanese) — iwatebank.co.jp
- The Shikoku Bank, Ltd., notice relaying Daiwa Securities' announcement to customers (October 5, 2026, Japanese) — shikokubank.co.jp
- Financial Services Agency, warning on unauthorized access and fraudulent trades in online trading (Japanese) — fsa.go.jp
- Nikkei (October 5, 2026, Japanese) — nikkei.com
- Kyodo News (October 5, 2026, via Yahoo! News Japan, Japanese) — news.yahoo.co.jp
Update history
2026-10-06: First version, based on Daiwa Securities' notice of October 5. The company says it will review the vendor's root-cause investigation; this article will be updated when new facts are published.
2026-10-07: Added the notices from the vendor (October 6) and Citizen Watch (October 6): a new section on the vendor's notice and other affected companies, FAQs on other companies and on card numbers written in inquiries, and an updated description of the cause based on the vendor's notice.
2026-10-10: Added the notices from Sompo Japan (October 7) and ORIX Life Insurance (October 8), and from Tobu Railway (October 7) and au Jibun Bank (October 9), which use the same vendor's service but found no effect on their own data. Added a table of the companies to the section on the vendor's notice and updated the FAQ on other companies.
2026-10-11: Added the vendor's own October 6 notice (including its planned measures) to the sources. Added Citizen Watch's dedicated inquiry form. Noted that the Iwate Bank and Shikoku Bank notices relay Daiwa's announcement as its partners and do not add affected client companies.
2026-10-22: In Read next, described the Commune figure of 166,505 as counted per community.
Read next
- Another brokerage case from the same period: Rakuten Securities unauthorized access (up to 11.25M accounts)
- Another brokerage incident around the same time: Unauthorized access to Monex Securities' account-opening system (up to 1.13M email addresses)
- A contractor-route incident affecting several companies (digital bond contractor, Marui Group, Sony Bank and others): Unauthorized access to a digital bond contractor (Securitize Japan)
- A similar case at another securities firm: Unauthorized access to SMBC Nikko Securities' employee stock plan system (up to 56,487 members)
- A newer case via a service provider (overseas bank): cyberattack on Crédit Mutuel Arkéa, fraudulent transfers via a provider’s platform
- Preparing for follow-on scams: What is phishing? / What is a passkey?
- Protecting your sign-in: Choosing MFA the right way / How to check if your password has leaked
- Other Japanese incidents this month: Yakiniku King app breach / Times Car breach
- Customer data at risk on a contractor's PC: Malware on a Daiichikosho contractor's PC (about 8.72 million records)
- Member data of many companies leaked through one service: Unauthorized access to Commune (166,505 community members, counted per community)
- Another securities firm this month: Iwai Cosmo Securities vendor breach (4,975 customers, unintended orders in 7 accounts)
- Other 2026 incidents: Data breaches and cyberattacks of 2026