Who this is for: anyone running a site or mailbox on shared hosting. This guide is about the case where you did nothing wrong and your provider was the one compromised. It is based on public information — the provider's own disclosure and reporting on it — and contains no attack techniques.
This article uses the 2026 Sakura Internet case to work through what a customer can actually do when the provider they pay is the one that got breached. The case detail comes after the steps. If you are not sure whether you are affected, do steps 1 and 2 anyway.
Do this first (in order — skip what does not apply)
If you have a Sakura Internet account at all, you may be in scope — hosting customer or not
What the second report implicates is the sales management system that holds contract records, and the company's FAQ states that scope is not limited to rental server customers. A domain-only, VPS-only, or long-dormant member registration can be in scope. Guidance has moved on from the first report's "we will contact you individually if action is needed" to concrete precautionary advice. If that is you, do step 1 today.
Change any password you reused elsewhere (highest priority)
The FAQ update of 21 August set the priority explicitly. The member console requires two-factor authentication at login, so "a password alone cannot log in, and there is no strong need to change it immediately". What the company does urge strongly: if the same password is used on other web services, change it on those other services. What needs protecting is not the service that leaked, but the other services where the same password works. That is how a provider-side incident usually turns into your incident. A password manager is what makes that audit tractable.
If you are still using the initial password from sign-up, change it today
The 10 September report disclosed a category of data that had not been mentioned before: some initial server passwords for the shared hosting service, and some administrator initial passwords for the VPS product. The company describes these as "not hashed".
The description "not hashed" alone does not establish whether a password was stored as plaintext or whether a retrieved value could be used directly. The actionable point is that the company asks customers still using an issued initial password to change it.
The test is simple: if you changed your password at any point after signing up, this does not apply to you. If you cannot remember changing it, or you are still using the credentials from the welcome message, change it today — and check whether that same password is in use anywhere else with a password manager. Why leaving an issued password in place is risky in general is covered in password habits that actually matter.
Change your server and mail passwords, and check your second factor
For hosting customers the company names the server (FTP) password and mail account passwords, and recommends changing those as a precaution. Check your two-factor settings while you are there, and move from emailed codes to SMS or an authenticator app — in an incident where mail data itself may have been read, a code sent to that mailbox is a weak second factor. The FAQ also asks customers to confirm that the registered email address and phone number still work, and to clean up accounts they no longer use. Do all of it by going to the official site yourself, never through a link in an email. The hashed-password exposure named so far covers 30 accounts, but customers cannot tell whether they are among them — which is exactly why acting pre-emptively is rational.
Inventory the secrets on that server and move them
Look for .env files, database dumps, backup archives, config files holding API keys, customer CSVs — anywhere in or near the published directory. What this incident lists as possibly exposed is precisely "information stored within the customer area". Assume anything sitting there has been read. For layout specifics see keeping .env out of reach on shared hosting and what must never sit in a public directory.
Separate your hosting credentials from everything else
Control panel, FTP/SSH, mail and database passwords should exist nowhere else, so one exposure does not spread to other accounts. Put multi-factor authentication on the control panel, and prefer passkeys where offered. A password manager is what makes this sustainable.
Keep a backup outside the provider
If the provider is the compromised party, backups held inside that same provider lose some of their trustworthiness. Keep a copy locally or at an unrelated provider — and one you have actually restored from once. The model is in backup and recovery essentials (the 3-2-1 rule).
Check the three signals, and expect phishing
The checks the company asked customers to run: unfamiliar files or administrator accounts, unexplained changes to your site or application, and logins or mail sends you cannot account for. Expect a wave of phishing impersonating the hosting company — the company states plainly that it never asks for passwords, credentials or card details by email or phone. The FAQ added on 2 September names support@sakura.ad.jp as the sender of its notices — treat that as grounds to reject a mismatch, not as proof that a match is genuine, since sender addresses can be forged. Do not follow links in those emails; go to the official site yourself.
What was disclosed (from the company’s own statements)
Sakura Internet Inc. disclosed unauthorised access on 17 August 2026, followed with a second report on 19 August, and on 10 September published its investigation results and remediation plan. Alongside the account counts, the final report gives the period in which unauthorized access occurred. Everything below comes from the company's own statements and its FAQ.
April 2023 – March 2026
(established in the final report) The window in which unauthorised access to the sales management system took place. The company states it "confirmed that it occurred between April 2023 and March 2026". This is the reported period of occurrence.July 2025 onwards
(established in the final report) Traces of suspicious activity believed to date from July 2025 or later were found in the shared hosting environment.9 Aug 2026
An anomaly was detected on a maintenance server for the shared hosting service, and the investigation opened. That anomaly triggered the investigation. The reported period of unauthorized access to the sales management system was April 2023 to March 2026.During the investigation
Confirmed that a third party had reached some customer environments by way of the company's management environment, and that malware had been placed on some servers.Immediately after confirmation
Containment: credentials invalidated, access blocked, malware removed.17 Aug 2026
First report (583 accounts), plus reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Personal Information Protection Commission and other authorities.19 Aug 2026
Second report: possible access to the sales management system, 1,360,563 member accounts potentially in scope, and a dedicated FAQ page.10 Sep 2026
Investigation results and remediation plan: the count rises to 951 accounts, the intrusion window is fixed, some initial passwords are disclosed as unhashed, and the company concludes that no clear grounds were found linking the two events.
- 951 hosting accounts (up from 583 in the final report)
- User identifiers and data stored in the customer area — mail data, website data, log data and other files held in the customer area
- 1,360,563 member accounts
- Contract records — member ID, company name, department, address, name, phone number, email address, date of birth, gender, fax number, contracted services, contract period, billing amounts and similar
- 30 of those accounts
- Hashed password data (the company defines this as data from which the original password is difficult to recover)
- Payment card data
- The company states it does not store card data, so none was exposed
- Unhashed initial passwords
- Some initial server passwords for the shared hosting service and some administrator initial passwords for the VPS product. The final report states these were "not hashed", and the company is asking customers still using an issued initial password to change it
- Exfiltration
- The final report states that "no clear facts confirming that data was taken outside the company have been identified", and that no publication on the internet or dark web has been observed
- Who is in scope
- The FAQ states plainly that scope is not limited to rental server customers — anyone with a member registration is being examined
Do not misread the 1.36 million (updated for the final report)
1,360,563 is the count of member records potentially in scope, not a confirmed leak — the company's FAQ says explicitly that there is no finding that all of them leaked. It is not a reason for comfort either. Four points drive what you actually do. (1) The intrusion path is still unpublished even in the final report — the company states it is withholding technical detail on the intrusion path and system configuration to avoid enabling copycat attacks. (2) "Possible access" is not "was exfiltrated". (3) The hashed-password exposure covers 30 accounts — expect that figure to get conflated with the 1.36 million in secondhand coverage. (4) But the unhashed initial passwords are a separate item, newly disclosed on 10 September, and that one is actionable today. Do not upgrade unknowns into facts, and do not read "unconfirmed" as "fine".
Why customer-side hardening does not stop it
Attacker
↓ entry path not disclosed
Provider management environment
↓ reaches customer environments through here
Your environment
files / database / mail
What a customer can deploy
strong passwords, patched apps, IP limits — none of them sit on that path
The only variable you hold is what is sitting in that area. So the goal is not "keep them out" but "make being read survivable".
Outside your control
- The intrusion into the provider's management environment
- Attackers reaching your area through that management path
- Learning about it promptly — here, eight days passed between detection and disclosure; taking time to investigate before disclosing is normal, and in the meantime customers had no way to know
Yours to decide
- What you store there — secrets, personal data, credentials
- Whether that password also works somewhere else
- Whether your only backup lives inside the same provider
- Whether you have any means of noticing something is wrong
This site's view: shrinking what you'd lose beats changing your contract
Every incident like this produces the advice "leave shared hosting, get a VPS". We do not recommend that as a default response. A VPS does isolate you further, but it also hands you full responsibility for OS and middleware patching; without the operational capacity to keep up, the result is a neglected server that becomes its own entry point. This site itself runs on infrastructure it does not have to itself, and the operating principle there is "make it survivable if that host is read" — secrets held as environment variables managed outside the published tree, credentials scoped per purpose, and the canonical copy of backups and published content kept elsewhere. The contract type is not a defense; it is one factor that affects how much damage a breach can do.
How the disclosure evolved: first report to final report
Incident facts never arrive all at once. In this case, the details that changed what customers should do landed in the FAQ before they landed in a news release. What follows is only what became known later, in order.
What the 2 September FAQ update added
On 2 September the company added several FAQ entries, more than a week before the third report on 10 September. The points below remained unchanged in that report. Check the FAQ as well as the press releases for guidance.
Cancelling a service is not the same as deleting your account — former customers are in scope too
Asked why people who had already cancelled were receiving notices, the company explained that cancelling a service (ending an active contract) and withdrawing membership (requesting deletion of the member record) are separate procedures, and that member records are retained unless you withdraw. The sales management system that was accessed held exactly those records, so people who no longer use any Sakura service are still in scope.
This is not specific to one provider. A service you stopped using has not deleted your data just because you cancelled the subscription — when it is breached, the accounts you had forgotten about are breached with it. Once a year, take the services you no longer use past cancellation to actual account deletion. Cutting the number of dormant accounts pays off about as much as ending password reuse does. The same pattern, where something you stopped using becomes a weakness, shows up in subdomain takeover.
"Not confirmed" is not the same as "did not happen"
The new entries draw a boundary around the questions customers actually ask. Every one of them is phrased as "as of now, no such fact has been confirmed", and the investigation is still open. Read them as unresolved, not as denials.
- Mail bodies and received mail
- No confirmed fact that message bodies or received mail inside mail accounts were viewed or taken — the second report concerns the system holding contract records
- WordPress data, site data, contact form submissions
- No confirmed fact that these were viewed or taken by a third party
- Domain and DNS settings
- No confirmed fact of unauthorised change; the company suggests reviewing your settings in the member console
- Per-customer confirmation
- The company states it is not in a position to confirm, customer by customer, whether data was viewed or taken. So "I was not contacted" does not mean "I was not affected" — acting precautionarily is the only option available
What the 10 September report established: the duration matters more than the count
The final report also disclosed the period of past unauthorized access
The company states that "unauthorised access to the sales management system was confirmed to have occurred between April 2023 and March 2026". In the hosting environment, traces believed to date from July 2025 or later were also found. Yet the anomaly that started the investigation was detected on 9 August 2026 — and it was detected on a maintenance server for the hosting service.
Read the reported period of access and the maintenance-server detection date as dates for their respective events. For your own operations, check how far back your logs let you investigate. The company lists "reviewing the scope of security logging, retention periods, and the analysis capability" among its remediation measures.
Newly established on 10 September
- Unauthorised access to the sales management system occurred between April 2023 and March 2026
- Hosting-environment traces were believed to date from July 2025 or later
- Scope rose from 583 to 951 accounts (368 added by follow-up investigation)
- Some initial passwords were not hashed — initial server passwords for shared hosting, administrator initial passwords for the VPS product
- No clear grounds were found linking the two events
Still not confirmed, even in the final report
- Any clear fact confirming data was taken outside the company
- Publication on the internet or the dark web
- Secondary misuse, fraudulent use, or financial loss
- The intrusion path — explicitly withheld to avoid enabling copycat attacks
This site's view: for a customer, the value of this report is one line about initial passwords
The report lists seven remediation measures, and nearly all of them are things only the provider can do — auditing administrative privileges, widening EDR coverage, rebuilding every server, commissioning external audits. Exactly one passage tells a customer to do something today: the one saying certain initial passwords were not hashed. Faced with a long incident report the instinct is to understand all of it; the more useful habit is the opposite — find the variables you control first. The rest is material for choosing your next provider, not for tonight.
As an investigation progresses, a provider may disclose more about past activity and affected data. Customers can prepare a design that limits the damage if the provider is compromised: keep credentials separate and hold backups outside the provider. That remains this article’s conclusion.
Sources
The facts above come from the following public records. No inference about the intrusion path, and no claim beyond what has been published.
- Sakura Internet Inc., "Regarding unauthorised access to part of our rental server service environment" (first report, published 17 August 2026) — sakura.ad.jp
- Sakura Internet Inc., "Notice regarding unauthorised access to our systems (second report)" (published 19 August 2026, updated 18:40 the same day) — sakura.ad.jp
- Sakura Internet Inc., "Investigation Results and Remediation Measures Regarding the Unauthorised Access to Our Systems (Third Report)" (published 10 September 2026) — sakura.ad.jp
- Sakura Internet Inc., "Notice and FAQ (published 19 August 2026, updated 21 August and 2 September; checked again for this article on 10 September 2026) — help.sakura.ad.jp
- Reporting by INTERNET Watch, ITmedia NEWS and Nikkei (17 and 19 August 2026), all based on the statements above
Update log
2026-10-31: The search-result description now separates the 951 affected hosting accounts from the 1,360,563 member records potentially in scope. Both figures were rechecked against the official notices. The source-verification date is unchanged.
2026-10-20: Corrected the wording to avoid inferring a storage format from "not hashed" and to distinguish the reported access period from an undetected period. The source-verification date is unchanged.
2026-09-21: Restructured. The steps now come first so a reader can act, and the first-to-final report sequence is consolidated into "How the disclosure evolved" at the end. No facts were added or changed (the verification date is unchanged).
2026-09-10: Investigation results and remediation plan (third report) folded in. The company reported unauthorized access to the sales management system between April 2023 and March 2026, and hosting-environment traces believed to date from July 2025 or later. Scope rose from 583 to 951 accounts. The company newly disclosed that some initial server passwords for shared hosting and some administrator initial passwords for the VPS product were not hashed, so a step was added (change any initial password still in use, today). The company concluded that no clear grounds link the two events. Exfiltration remains unconfirmed, and the intrusion path is explicitly withheld to avoid enabling copycat attacks.
2026-09-05: FAQ update of 2 September folded in. The company explained that cancelling a service and withdrawing membership are separate procedures, and member records are retained until you withdraw, which is why former customers are in scope. It also drew a boundary around mail bodies, WordPress and site data, contact form submissions and DNS settings ("no confirmed fact" as of that date, with the investigation still open), and stated that it cannot confirm exposure customer by customer. A new section covers all of this, and the sender address used for its notices (support@sakura.ad.jp) was added. The intrusion path is still unpublished; the next announcement is targeted for mid-September 2026.
2026-08-22: FAQ update of 21 August folded in. The member console requires two-factor authentication, so the company says there is no strong need to change that password immediately; what it urges instead is changing any password reused on other services. The steps were reordered accordingly, and server/mail password changes plus second-factor checks are now a separate step. Confirming registered contact details and pruning unused accounts were also added to the FAQ. No third press release has been published as of writing.
2026-08-20: Second report (19 Aug) folded in. Possible unauthorised access to the sales management system holding contract records, with 1,360,563 member accounts potentially in scope (hashed password data for 30 of them). The company's FAQ now recommends a precautionary password change, so that became the first step, and scope is no longer limited to rental server customers. The intrusion path remains unpublished.
2026-08-18: First version, based on the first disclosure.
Read next
- A website-building service disclosure: Studio unauthorized access and guidance for form users and site operators
- Preparing for the emergency PHP fix: Two critical PHP vulnerabilities and the emergency release (October 2026)
- Comparing 2026's major cases: what KDDI, Aflac, the Digital Agency and Sakura Internet have in common
- When the VPN is the way in: VPN appliances are the main way in for ransomware: remote access defense after the Digital Agency breach
- Another unauthorized access case at a hosting service: unauthorized access to some ConoHa WING (GMO Internet) web servers (426 accounts) (data in customers' web server areas affected)
- A hosting provider that reset some customers' passwords: DreamHost incident (October 2026) (some email, FTP and SFTP passwords reset)
- Checking your own site: how to check if your website or server was hacked (shared hosting, WordPress, VPS)
- Practice: keeping .env out of reach on shared hosting / backup and recovery essentials / choosing multi-factor authentication
- Terms: what phishing is / what malware is
- Case: the Codecov supply-chain breach (2021) — the same shape, where a trusted path is compromised and customers cannot block it themselves
- A case at a vendor's cloud: JR East, VIEW Card and JR Kyushu email address leak (unauthorized access to the cloud platform behind their email delivery service)
- The pattern: 2026 breaches came through valid credentials (a cross-case read of the Japanese disclosures)