For: anyone who has registered on the job site MyBRANDS as a job seeker or an employer contact, including people who have left the service. This article is based on the company's official notice and does not cover attack methods.
Developing: this article will be updated as the organisation publishes more
- Who is affected
anyone who has registered on the job site MyBRANDS as a job seeker or an employer contact, including people who have left the service.
- Confirmed so farSee the table ↓
- Data sent out
Listed as possibly affected
- Name, email, phone, profile (such as work history)
- Login password
- Key to decrypt
- Not yet confirmed
- What the sent data actually contained (what was taken)
- Details of how the misused key came to be used, and the cause
- When all email notices will reach affected people
2 more
- When the service will resume
- Whether any misuse (secondary damage) occurs
- What to do nowSee the steps ↓
- Check whether you reused your MyBRANDS password
- Job seekers: check recruiter and scout messages through an official channel
- Employer contacts: warn colleagues and review the same person's accounts
2 more
- Check anything claiming to be from the company without opening links in the message
- Send inquiries by email to the MyBRANDS office
- Where to verify (source)All sources ↓
- iDA Co., Ltd., "Apology and notice regarding possible leak of personal information due to unauthorized access to MyBRANDS" (October 30, 2026; checked November 2; Japanese)
- Last checked
- As of November 2, 2026
Follow-up plans and what we checked
The company says it will announce on the notice page anything new it needs to tell people and the timing of resumption. On November 2 we checked the text of the October 30 notice (the company's site refuses automated access, so we read it in a browser). The text we retrieved contained no follow-up. The service is stopped and will not resume until safety is confirmed, it says.
What job seekers and employer contacts should do today
Check whether you reused your MyBRANDS password
The company asks people who use the same password as MyBRANDS on other services to change it there. For employer contacts this includes internal systems. It says no action is needed on MyBRANDS itself.
- Give each service where you reused the password its own, different password (How to check if your password was leaked)
- Turn on multi-factor authentication where you can
- If you cannot remember them all, use a password manager
Job seekers: check recruiter and scout messages through an official channel
With your name, phone number, email address and work history together, someone can write a convincing message saying "we saw your background". If a message about an interview date, a document check or a scout arrives, do not use the link or phone number in it. Check on the employer's official site or the job posting's contact that you opened yourself.
The company says that in its contacts about this incident it will not ask for login codes, passwords or anything involving money. Do not go along with contacts that do.
Employer contacts: warn colleagues and review the same person's accounts
The name, email address and phone number of an employer contact can be the target of messages posing as business partners or applicants. Check whether you used your MyBRANDS password on internal systems and change it if so. Also tell colleagues to be careful with suspicious messages posing as job postings or applicants (this site's advice).
Check anything claiming to be from the company without opening links in the message
The company says its emails about this incident contain no links. Treat an email or text that has a link or asks you to log in as not being a notice about this incident (this site's advice). The company says its emails about this incident are sent from the addresses in section 6 of its notice. It says it will notify affected people by email in turn from October 30.
Send inquiries by email to the MyBRANDS office
The company asks that inquiries about this incident go by email to the MyBRANDS office, not to the employer you applied to or the one that sent you a scout. It accepts them 24 hours a day, with separate contacts for job seekers and employers, and asks you to write from your registered email address. Use the addresses on the official notice page.
1. Call / email / SMS claiming to be a recruiter, scout or MyBRANDS
Name, work history, phone number are correct → do not decide here
↓
2. Skip the links and numbers; check on the employer's official site or the contact in the official notice
↓
3-A Nothing on the official side
Asks for login codes, passwords, money → do not comply
3-B The official side shows the same notice
Follow the official instructions
What happened (according to iDA Co., Ltd.)
This section is based on the company's notice "Apology and notice regarding possible leak of personal information due to unauthorized access to MyBRANDS" of October 30, 2026 (Japanese).
October 21 to 22, 2026
A cloud access key used by a contractor was misused by a third party (company's account). The company words this as having happened "while working on a vulnerability with the service stopped" (our translation)October 26
Learned that there were records of data being sent outside from a copy of the database (company's account)October 30
Notice published. As of the notice, it says it had reported to the Personal Information Protection Commission and consulted the police (no date given). Email notices to affected people start in turn from this dayNovember 2
This site checked the text of the notice. No follow-up stated
- Affected information
- Name, email address, phone number, profile (such as work history) and login password (a transformed value) and more of people registered on MyBRANDS, including people who have left. It varies by registration. Information of job seekers and employer contacts is covered
- Not included
- Credit card and bank account information was not held and is not included. Services other than MyBRANDS, such as iDA (ida-mode.com) and MyBRANDS Shinsotsu, are not covered
- Encryption and the key
- Name, email address, phone number and address were stored encrypted. The key to decrypt them may also have been taken
- Company response
- The service is stopped and will not resume until safety is confirmed. It reported to the Personal Information Protection Commission and consulted the police. It is investigating the cause with the contractor and working on preventing a recurrence
- Secondary damage
- No misuse of the information (secondary damage) has been confirmed so far
What is known and what is not
This is the state as of November 2, 2026. We will rewrite this table as updates appear.
| Item | What the company said | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Misuse of the key | A cloud access key used by a contractor was misused by a third party on October 21 to 22 | Company's account |
| Data sent out | There are records of data being sent outside from a copy of the database | Confirmed (company) |
| What the sent data contained | Could not be confirmed; all information it held is treated as in scope | Under investigation |
| Name, email, phone, profile (such as work history) | May have leaked outside | Possible (company) |
| Login password | The transformed value is among the information that may have leaked | Possible (company) |
| Address | Not named in the list (which ends with "etc."). The company treats all information it held as affected and names address among the items it stored encrypted | Not stated |
| Key to decrypt | May have been taken | Possible (company) |
| Credit card / bank account | Not held and not included | Not included (company) |
| Services other than MyBRANDS | Not covered | Not included (company) |
| Count | Up to about 135,000 (accounts, as of October 30), including people who have left | Up to (company's upper bound as of October 30) |
| Details of how the key came to be used | Not given | Under investigation |
| Misuse / secondary damage | None confirmed so far | Not confirmed (company) |
| Contact with affected people | Email notices sent in turn from October 30 (when all will have received them is not published) | Company's account |
| Regulators | The company says it reported to the Personal Information Protection Commission and consulted the police. We have not seen a statement from the authorities | Not stated (authorities) |
| Service resumption | Stopped; will not resume until safety is confirmed | Under investigation (timing not published) |
How to read this: "may have leaked" and "encrypted"
The company writes that the information "may have leaked outside" (our translation); since it could not confirm what was sent, it is notifying on the basis that all information it held is covered. This site uses the company's wording. Also, items stored encrypted are not safe to treat as unread, because the key to decrypt them may also have been taken. It is safest to prepare as if they have been read (this site's advice).
What names, contact details and work history can be used for
The following is what such combinations can generally lead to. The company has not said any of it happened in this incident.
- Name + email address + phone number: targets for convincing calls, emails and texts posing as a recruiter or scout
- Profile such as work history: lets a sender write "we saw your background" in specific terms, making the message harder to doubt. Be careful also with fake messages that use the company you applied to or the job type you want
- An employer contact's name, email and phone: targets for messages that look like business email, posing as partners or applicants
- Password (a transformed value): in general, short or common passwords can sometimes be worked back from the transformed value. It can be material for logging in to other services that share the password (What is password hashing?)
The company says card and bank account information is not included. Still, treat any message that uses an interview or hiring process as a pretext to ask for card numbers, account PINs or copies of ID by email or chat as probably fake.
What operators should review
How the key came to be used has not been published. We list only general points that follow from the disclosed course of events (a key used by a contractor, a copy of the database, and a decryption key that may also have been taken).
- Cloud keys given to contractors: use a separate key for each contractor, limit it to the operations and period needed (least privilege), recreate it regularly (rotation), and disable it when no longer needed. Take stock of keys that are no longer used
- Where encrypted data and its decryption key live: if one set of permissions reaches both, encryption does not protect the data. Keep keys in a separate key-management service or under separate permissions, so that who can read the data and who can use the key differ
- Database copies: protect copies made for testing or migration as strongly as production, and delete them when done. Limit who can create copies and the routes by which data can leave
- Detecting large transfers out: the company says it learned that there were records of data being sent outside. Logging outbound transfer volume and alerting on it shortens the time to notice
These are general points and do not mean the company failed to do any of them.
Sources (public records)
The facts here rest on the public information below. We have not guessed at details that were not published or at what the sent data contained. The company's site refuses automated access, so we read the text in a browser.
- iDA Co., Ltd., "Apology and notice regarding possible leak of personal information due to unauthorized access to MyBRANDS" (October 30, 2026; checked November 2; Japanese) — ida-mode.com
Update history
2026-11-02: First version, based on the company's October 30 notice (checked November 2, no follow-up found).
Read next
- The same job-site pattern: Unauthorized access at Baitoru (email addresses only, and preparing for fake interview messages)
- Incidents that start from credentials: 2026 breaches that started with stolen credentials
- Scam messages: What is phishing?
- For operators (key and secret management): Leaked credentials that stay valid
- Protecting your accounts: Choosing multi-factor authentication / Choosing a password manager
- Other 2026 incidents: Data breaches and cyberattacks in 2026 (Japan and worldwide)