For: admins and members of workspaces that use Notion AI. This article is based on Notion's official security advisory and does not cover attack steps.
Developing: this article will be updated as the organisation publishes more
- Who is affected
admins and members of workspaces that use Notion AI.
- Confirmed so farSee the table ↓
- Notion AI chat transcripts used for Insights
- Notion AI synthetic testing data
- Scope of affected workspaces
4 more
- Author and workspace labels on chats
- Vendor data retention
- Training experiments on the vendor
- Exposed Notion API keys
Listed as possibly affected
- Sensitive information and credentials pasted into chats
- Not yet confirmed
- The number of affected workspaces and chat transcripts (nothing beyond fewer than 1%)
- The incident timeframe (specific dates for the rotation advice)
- How the vendor was compromised (the advisory does not say)
1 more
- The final findings of the investigation and when Insights will return
- What to do nowSee the steps ↓
- Check whether you received a notice from the company
- If you were notified, review the data by following the instructions
- Treat the affected data as exposed
3 more
- Rotate credentials you pasted into Notion AI
- Be careful with messages claiming to be Notion
- Admins: set what may go into AI chats and map your vendor relationships
- Where to verify (source)All sources ↓
- Notion, "Notice about the Fireworks AI incident that may impact some Notion workspaces" (help page; checked November 13, 2026)
- Last checked
- As of November 13, 2026
Follow-up plans and what we checked
The company says the investigation is ongoing, that it will contact workspaces it determines were affected, and that it will update the advisory as it learns more. The advisory was updated on November 10 for style and clarity, with no changes to previously reported facts. Its November 11 update adds that the company revoked exposed Notion API keys found in affected user messages during the investigation. When we checked on November 13, 2026, we found nothing newer.
What to do today
Check whether you received a notice from the company
The company says it has contacted the affected workspaces. If you have not heard from it, it has not identified your workspace as affected and no action is needed right now. The investigation is ongoing, and it will contact you directly if that changes. Check your spam folder too.
If you were notified, review the data by following the instructions
The company says affected customers can retrieve and review the impacted data securely inside their workspace, with instructions sent by email. Per the help page, workspace owners open ? then Security incident review in the sidebar (latest Notion in a desktop browser only; not available on mobile). There is a CSV of affected members and a link members can use to review their own data, and workspaces with a verified domain also get CSVs of the affected content. Before opening links in that email, open the Notion app or admin console yourself and check whether the same notice appears there (this site's view: fake notices commonly circulate after incidents like this).
Treat the affected data as exposed
The company recommends that affected customers treat this data as if it were exposed. Look through the chats for customer personal information, internal confidential material or contract details, and if you find any, decide what to do under the rules that apply to each (this site's view).
Rotate credentials you pasted into Notion AI
The company recommends that people in affected workspaces who pasted sensitive information, passwords, API keys or other credentials into Notion AI during the incident timeframe rotate them. The advisory gives no specific dates for that timeframe, so if unsure, reissue at the source every credential you have pasted into Notion AI and revoke the old value (this site's view). On November 11 the company revoked exposed Notion API keys it found in affected user messages; it does not say it revoked other credentials, so rotate those yourself (this site's view). Per the help page, the content CSVs flag conversations that may contain sensitive information, which gives you a starting point. See what's actually dangerous about .env and API keys for handling keys.
Be careful with messages claiming to be Notion
Affected customers are told by email. Before opening a link in one, open the app or admin console yourself and check. Treat any message asking for your password or login code as fake (a general point). See what phishing is.
Admins: set what may go into AI chats and map your vendor relationships
See "What teams that use or provide AI features should review" below.
What happened (per Notion)
This is based on Notion's official security advisory (published November 9, 2026; updated November 10 and 11) and Notion's help page on the incident. It is the company's own account and has not been verified by a third party. The advisory's heading and text name the vendor, but this article refers to it by role. The advisory does not give times or time zones.
Nov 2 (evening)
The AI-processing vendor told the company that a small set of data had been accessed by malicious actors. On investigation it was Notion AI synthetic testing data, and no customer data was involved.Nov 3 (by morning)
As a precaution the company disconnected its systems from the vendor, deleted all data in the vendor's system, and stopped all communication from its systems to the vendor.Nov 6
The vendor told the company that malicious actors may have accessed potential customer data. The company treated it as an incident affecting fewer than 1% of workspaces and began another internal investigation.Nov 8
The vendor confirmed this new dataset. The company's analysis showed it contained Notion AI chat transcripts used for the Insights feature.Nov 9
The company published the advisory (updated November 10 for style and clarity, with no change to previously reported facts).Nov 11
The company added that it revoked exposed Notion API keys found in affected user messages during its investigation.
Nov 2
Vendor first reports (synthetic test data); Notion disconnects Nov 3
↓→
Nov 6-8
Possible customer data; found to be Insights chat transcripts
↓→
Nov 9
Advisory published (updated Nov 10); affected customers contacted
- First report (Nov 2)
- Access to a small set of data. It included Notion AI synthetic testing data and no customer data
- Second report (Nov 6; confirmed Nov 8)
- Data that could be customer data. It was Notion AI chat transcripts used for the Insights feature
- What 'unattributable' means (company)
- The chats were not labeled with who wrote them or which workspace they came from, and had no tool call results. Apart from the chat text itself, nothing ties them to a workspace, user or company. The advisory says this holds for "the vast majority" of impacted workspaces and does not give the number of exceptions
- How the vendor was used (company)
- For classification jobs behind Insights (a feature that helps customers understand their own AI usage) and as a general inference provider for serving open-weight models inside the product
- Company actions
- Disconnected from the vendor, deleted the data held there and stopped all communication (by the morning of Nov 3). Contacted affected customers. Disabled Insights during the investigation. No longer serves open-weight models through the vendor
- Vendor contract and retention (company)
- The vendor had contractually committed to zero data retention for Notion's use, but the investigation found data was retained from the vendor endpoints Notion used. Features that need stored requests and responses, such as Insights, are not covered by the enterprise zero data retention commitment
- Training experiments (company)
- Notion had used data volunteered by customers in its Learning and Early Access Program (LEAP) to experiment with training task-specific models on the vendor. As of November 3 all training runs were halted
- What a transcript includes (company)
- Any input to or output from the model that was written to the chat. AI Meeting Notes audio, transcripts and summaries were not affected unless used as input in a Notion AI chat
- Exposed API keys (November 11)
- During its investigation the company revoked exposed Notion API keys found in affected user messages
- Review screen (help page)
- Owners: ? in the sidebar, then Security incident review. Desktop browser only. CSV of affected members, a link for members, and content CSVs for verified-domain workspaces. The added context (record, workspace and user IDs and so on) was added by Notion for analysis and was not exposed
- Stated as not affected
- The company says this was not a breach of its systems, and that no other Notion features were affected
- Recommended actions
- Review the data inside the workspace (instructions by email). Treat it as exposed. Rotate sensitive information, passwords, API keys or other credentials pasted into Notion AI during the incident timeframe
What is known and what is not
Status as of November 13, 2026. This table will be updated as the company publishes more.
| Item | What was disclosed | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Notion AI chat transcripts used for Insights | Accessed by malicious actors; the vendor confirmed it on Nov 8 | Confirmed (company) |
| Notion AI synthetic testing data | The first dataset; no customer data | Confirmed (company) |
| Scope of affected workspaces | Fewer than 1% | Confirmed (company) |
| Author and workspace labels on chats | Absent for the vast majority of impacted workspaces | Confirmed (company) |
| Tool call results | Not included | Not included (company) |
| Other Notion features | Not affected | Not included (company) |
| AI Meeting Notes (audio, transcripts, summaries) | Not affected unless used as input in a Notion AI chat | Not included (company) |
| Vendor data retention | Contract said zero data retention, but data was retained on the endpoints Notion used | Confirmed (company) |
| Training experiments on the vendor | Experiments used data from LEAP customers; halted as of November 3 | Confirmed (company) |
| Exposed Notion API keys | Found in affected user messages; revoked November 11 | Confirmed (company) |
| Breach of Notion's own systems | Described as not a breach | Not included (company) |
| Sensitive information and credentials pasted into chats | Rotation recommended if pasted during the timeframe | Possible (company) |
| Incident timeframe | No specific dates | Not stated |
| Number of affected workspaces and transcripts | Nothing beyond fewer than 1% | Not stated |
| Cause of the vendor's compromise | Not described | Not stated |
| Final findings; return of Insights | Investigation ongoing; no date | Under investigation |
How to read this: 'unlabeled' does not mean what you wrote is safe
The company's "unattributable" means the chat carries no label for who wrote it or which workspace it came from. If the text itself holds names, company names, customer information, passwords or API keys, that text can be read, which is why the company recommends rotating credentials. Because the wording is "the vast majority", the advisory does not tell you whether a few chats do carry labels.
How this relates to another incident
The advisory names, as its vendor, a provider of AI inference infrastructure and points readers to that provider's official updates. The provider's October and November 9 official statements are summarized in a separate article on this site: unauthorized access at Fireworks AI (billing data and datasets affected).
Notion presents its incident as the vendor's incident and links to the vendor's official updates. However, the provider's official statement (updated November 9) does not mention Notion, and neither statement explains how the events Notion describes for November 2 to 8 relate to the events the provider describes for October 23 to 25. This site does not add a link between them that neither organisation has made.
What can happen when chat transcripts are accessed
What follows is general and does not mean these things happened here. What happened here, as the company states it, is limited to the section above.
AI chats can contain customer names, internal figures, contract details, code fragments, passwords and API keys, as they come up in the course of work. Even an unlabeled chat can sometimes point to a company or a person from its text. A pasted credential keeps working until it is revoked at the source, so the risky period lasts until you rotate it.
What teams that use or provide AI features should review
This section does not evaluate the company's response and does not speculate about the vendor's compromise. Based on the disclosed course of events, it covers only what to check in your own setup, as this site's view.
Set what may go into AI chats
The company's advice was to rotate any passwords or API keys that had been pasted. If you decide up front that credentials and customers' personal information do not go into AI chats, the amount to rotate shrinks. Rules are easier to follow when they give concrete examples of what is prohibited (this site's view).
List what data you send to the vendors that process AI work for you
What the company sent its vendor was chat transcripts for Insights classification. If you provide an AI feature, keep a list of which data goes to which outside vendor, for which feature and for how long, so you can state the scope quickly in an incident (this site's view).
Send data in a form that cannot be tied to a person
In the company's account, the chats in most affected workspaces could not be tied to a person or workspace. Stripping author and workspace identifiers from data sent outside reduces the harm if a vendor is compromised (what Notion's account shows; this site's view).
Prepare to cut a vendor off
The company says that by the morning after the first report it had disconnected from the vendor, deleted the data held there and stopped communication. Having a written procedure, with timings, for stopping the connection, asking for deletion and revoking keys is what makes a first response like that possible (this site's view).
Decide who tells customers when a vendor reports an incident
The company heard from its vendor on November 6 and published on November 9. Decide in advance who assesses impact when a vendor calls and by when customers are told (this site's view). A similar case in which an AI infrastructure incident reached customers is in unauthorized access at Fireworks AI.
Sources (public record)
The facts in this article are based on the following public sources. Attack steps are not covered.
- Notion, "Notice about the Fireworks AI incident that may impact some Notion workspaces" (help page; checked November 13, 2026) — notion.com
- Notion, "Security incident involving a third-party AI vendor" (official security advisory; published November 9, 2026, updated November 10 and 11; checked November 13; the latest version is the URL without -nov9) — notion.com (November 9 version: -nov9)
- The vendor's official security bulletins index (which the advisory points to; checked November 13) — fireworks.ai
Update history
2026-11-13: Reflected the November 11 update to Notion's advisory (revocation of exposed Notion API keys) and Notion's help page. Added that the vendor had contractually committed to zero data retention but data was retained on the endpoints Notion used, the training experiments on the vendor (halted), that AI Meeting Notes were not affected, and the owner review screen with CSVs; corrected the earlier statement that the November 11 update changed no facts. The incident timeframe and the number of affected workspaces are still not stated.
2026-11-12: First version, based on Notion's official security advisory (published November 9, updated November 10 and 11). We will update this when more is published.
Read next
- The AI infrastructure side of this: unauthorized access at Fireworks AI (billing data and datasets affected)
- A case where AI infrastructure keys were the focus: the Northflank security incident
- Handling keys: what's actually dangerous about .env and API keys / what phishing is
- Other 2026 incidents: list of data breaches and cyberattacks