For: users of local-currency and e-money apps run on the Pokepay (Enterprise) platform (Hokupay, the Fuku app and others), and their merchants and operators. Mebuku Pay also suspended all services at the same time, but its notice does not name its outside contractor, so its link to Pokepay is not confirmed. This article is based on official notices from Pocket Change Inc. and the service operators and does not cover attack methods.
Developing: this article will be updated as the organisation publishes more
- Who is affected
users of local-currency and e-money apps run on the Pokepay (Enterprise) platform (Hokupay, the Fuku app and others), and their merchants and operators. Mebuku Pay also suspended all services at the same time, but its notice does not name its outside contractor, so its link to Pokepay is not confirmed.
- Confirmed so farSee the table ↓
- Unauthorized access
- Suspension and restart
Listed as possibly affected
- Hokupay merchants' application information
- Not yet confirmed
- Investigation results (cause and course of events)
- Items and counts exposed (operator's statement)
- Number of affected merchants on other services
- What to do nowSee the steps ↓
- Check your balance and usage history in the official app
- Do not open links in messages claiming to be the operator or e-money service
- Resume bank-account top-ups as the operator instructs
3 more
- Merchants: check any request to change or confirm payout details through an official contact
- Review merchant-console passwords and authentication
- Use the contact points on the operator's official site
- Where to verify (source)All sources ↓
- Pocket Change Inc., "Important: Notice of service suspension following confirmed unauthorized access (first report)" (November 14, 2026; Japanese)
- Last checked
- As of November 19, 2026
Follow-up plans and what we checked
In its third and fourth reports, Pocket Change Inc. says it will report the investigation results after examining them. As of November 19, no such report was found on the company's official site.
What users and merchants should do today
Check your balance and usage history in the official app
Mebuku Pay says it has not confirmed that balances or transaction records were altered. Even so, look in the official app that you open yourself for any use you do not recognise or any balance that looks wrong. If you find one, contact that service's support.
Do not open links in messages claiming to be the operator or e-money service
Mebuku Pay urges caution about suspicious emails, SMS and calls posing as the company and says it never asks for passwords, credit card numbers or account PINs (how to tell fakes: What is phishing). Do not open links in messages about a balance check, re-registration or apology points; check through the app or the official site.
Resume bank-account top-ups as the operator instructs
Kita City resumed bank-account top-ups at 16:00 on November 18 and asks users who want them to register their bank account in the app again. Mebuku Pay resumed bank-account top-ups on November 18 and, saying saved bank-account details were deleted in a system update, asks users to register again. Status differs by service, so check the notice in your own app.
Merchants: check any request to change or confirm payout details through an official contact
The merchant items that may have leaked include the representative's date of birth, address, phone number, email address and payout bank account information (Kita City) and store address, phone number, payout account information and contact-person name (Mebuku Pay). With those, a message posing as the operator or a bank that asks you to confirm payout details or re-register an account can look convincing.
Do not use the link or phone number in the message. Contact the operator yourself through the contact listed on its official site.
Review merchant-console passwords and authentication
Kita City says it reset merchant-console login passwords (November 15) and introduced two-step authentication (November 16). Merchants who received reset or setup instructions from their operator should set a new password as instructed. If you reused the password elsewhere, separate them (password manager).
Use the contact points on the operator's official site
Mebuku Pay lists its call center (050-3315-9911, weekdays 9:00 to 17:00) and Kita City its Industrial Promotion Division (03-5390-1235). The Fuku app secretariat is 0776-50-7671. Use the numbers on each official site, not ones in a message you received.
What happened (from each organisation's notices)
Pocket Change Inc. provides the Pokepay e-money platform and separates "Pokepay (Enterprise)", for municipalities and companies, from the shop-facing "Pokepay". Everything below is based on the statements of the company and each operator.
November 14, 2026 (Sat)
Pocket Change confirmed unauthorized access by a third party to the Pokepay (Enterprise) system and, as a precaution, suspended all Pokepay (Enterprise) services from 20:00 (first report). The shop-facing Pokepay was not affected and was not suspended.November 15 (Sun)
The planned restart (9:00) was moved to 15:00 (second report). Pokepay (Enterprise) resumed at 16:40. Some externally linked functions, such as credit-card top-ups and BankPay top-ups, stayed suspended for additional safety measures (third report).November 16 (Mon)
Mebuku Pay resumed balance checks, payments, transfers and card and ATM top-ups at 10:00.November 17 (Tue)
Kita City announced that application information of 801 merchants may have leaked. Mebuku Pay reported viewing records for seven merchants.November 18 (Wed)
Pocket Change resumed credit-card top-ups, BankPay top-ups and other functions and said all functions are available as usual (fourth report). Kita City resumed bank-account top-ups at 16:00. Mebuku Pay also resumed bank-account top-ups.
- Pocket Change (platform operator)
- The first to fourth reports do not state the items or counts of exposed data. It says it will report the investigation results after examining them
- Hokupay (Kita City, Tokyo)
- Citing the company's report: application information of some merchants (the representative's date of birth, address, phone number, email address, payout bank account information and so on) may have leaked. 801 shops. Leakage of users' phone numbers and credit card information has not been confirmed. Misuse of information has not been confirmed
- Mebuku Pay (its notice does not name the contractor; link to Pokepay unconfirmed)
- The system accessed belongs to an outside contractor that handles payment processing. Records of third-party viewing were found for seven merchants covering store information (postal code, address, phone number), payout account information (bank name, account number, account holder and so on) and contact-person names. Leakage of users' phone numbers and email addresses has not been confirmed. Alteration or misuse of balances and transaction records has not been confirmed
- Fuku app (Fukui Digital)
- It learned on November 14 of unauthorized access and suspended all services from 20:00, resuming at 16:45 on November 15. It explains that this was caused by unauthorized access to Pokepay, the platform behind its payment and authentication services
- Could not confirm
- Notices from other services, such as Hachi Pay (Shibuya City), could not be read by automated fetch, so this article does not cover them
Reading the numbers: do not add 801 shops and seven merchants
The 801 shops are Hokupay merchants and the seven merchants are Mebuku Pay merchants. These are statements by separate operators, and it is not known whether they count the same merchants. The operator has not published a combined total.
What is known and what is not
As of November 19, 2026 (reflecting the fourth report of November 18 and each operator's statements through November 18). When more is published, this table will be rewritten.
| Item | What the notices say | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthorized access | Third-party unauthorized access to the Pokepay (Enterprise) system confirmed (November 14) | Confirmed (company) |
| Suspension and restart | Full stop at 20:00 on Nov 14, restart at 16:40 on the 15th, external-link functions back on the 18th | Confirmed (company) |
| Hokupay merchants' application information | Representative's date of birth, address, phone, email, payout bank account information and so on; 801 shops | Possible (Kita City) |
| Mebuku Pay merchants' information | Store information, payout account information, contact-person names; viewing records for seven merchants | Viewing records found (Mebuku Pay) |
| Users' phone numbers and card information | Leakage not confirmed (Kita City) | Not confirmed (Kita City) |
| Mebuku Pay users' phone numbers and email addresses | Leakage not confirmed | Not confirmed (Mebuku Pay) |
| Alteration of balances and transaction records | Not confirmed (Mebuku Pay) | Not confirmed (Mebuku Pay) |
| Misuse of information | Not confirmed at present (Kita City) | Not confirmed (Kita City) |
| Overall impact known to the platform operator | Not published | Under investigation |
| Cause and course of events | Not published | Under investigation |
What merchants' contact and account details can be used for
In general, a representative's name, date of birth, address, phone number, email address and payout account details together make a convincing fake message possible. This does not mean any of this happened in this incident; it is what can generally happen.
- Messages posing as the operator: a "password reset" or "merchant information re-check" that sends you to a fake site to enter login details.
- Messages posing as a bank or business partner: if the payout account is known, a fake request to "change the payout account" is easier to believe.
- Impersonation by phone or SMS: if the representative's phone number is known, it can be used in a call that pretends to verify identity.
For users, the operators say leakage of phone numbers and card information has not been confirmed. The basic defense against fake messages is the same.
For operators of e-money and local-currency services, and teams that build on a platform
The cause has not been published, so this is limited to what the published facts show.
Explain your own service's impact separately from the platform vendor's restart notices
Here the platform operator's notices gave no items or counts, and Kita City, Mebuku Pay and the Fuku app each explained the impact on their own service. Know in advance what your own service stores on the platform so you can explain it without waiting for the vendor's report. Mebuku Pay explained that only phone numbers and email addresses of user data were in the contractor's system.
Do not leave merchant consoles on initial passwords; require multi-factor authentication
Kita City reset console passwords (November 15) and introduced two-step authentication (November 16). A merchant console is where application data (accounts, contacts) is visible. Avoid keeping password-only sign-in (Choosing multi-factor authentication).
Restart externally linked functions only after safety is confirmed
Pocket Change kept credit-card and BankPay top-ups off for days after the platform came back, to add safety measures for external connections. Kita City asks users to re-register accounts after bank top-ups resumed. Decide the order of restarts and what you will ask users to do in advance.
Sources (public record)
The facts in this article rest on the public information below. Causes and methods that have not been published are not speculated about.
- Pocket Change Inc., "Important: Notice of service suspension following confirmed unauthorized access (first report)" (November 14, 2026; Japanese) — pokepay.jp
- Same, second report (November 15) — pokepay.jp
- Same, "Pokepay (Enterprise) service resumed (third report)" (November 15) — pokepay.jp
- Same, "Credit-card top-ups and other functions resumed (fourth report)" (November 18) — pokepay.jp
- Kita City, Tokyo, "Unauthorized access damage to the Hokupay service" (November 17, 2026) — city.kita.lg.jp
- Kita City, "Unauthorized access to the Hokupay service" (updated November 18) — city.kita.lg.jp
- Mebuku Pay, "Report and apology on the investigation of unauthorized access to the Mebuku Pay payment system (as of November 17)" — mebukupay.com
- Fukui Digital, Inc., "Temporary suspension of the Fuku app (third report)" (November 15, 2026) — fukui-digital.co.jp
Update history
2026-11-19: First version, based on Pocket Change's first to fourth reports (through November 18) and the official notices of Kita City, Mebuku Pay and Fukui Digital. As of November 19, no investigation report was found. This article will be updated when it is published.
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- Other 2026 incidents: Data breaches and cyberattacks (Japan and overseas)