For: staff at shippers and trade companies that use the Shippio Platform, and their business partners. This article is based on Shippio, Inc.'s official notices (first to third reports) and does not cover attack techniques.
Developing: this article will be updated as the organisation publishes more
- Who is affected
staff at shippers and trade companies that use the Shippio Platform, and their business partners.
- Confirmed so farSee the table ↓
- Company name, team name, address, phone number
- Shipment information, document file names and types
- Document file contents
4 more
- Users' names and email addresses
- Billing amounts
- Unauthorized accounts and API credentials
- Service status
Listed as possibly affected
- Internal shared files
- Not yet confirmed
- Detailed cause and measures against recurrence
- Details of the downloaded document files
- Range of customer information in the internal shared files
2 more
- Range of people whose personal information was taken
- Findings of the outside security specialist
- What to do nowSee the steps ↓
- Reset your Shippio password, and separate reused passwords
- Do not open documents or contacts you do not recognise
- Verify shipment, invoice and bank-detail messages by a separate channel
3 more
- Check data from before the stop against your originals
- Re-set up share links and API integrations, and look for accounts you do not recognise
- Wait for an individual notice; use the official contact
- Where to verify (source)All sources ↓
- Shippio, Inc., "Apology and report on the leak of personal information and temporary service suspension following unauthorized access to our platform" (first report, November 4, 2026, Japanese)
- Last checked
- As of November 17, 2026
Follow-up plans and what we checked
The company says it will promptly announce on the same page when its investigation and reports are complete or new facts emerge. It published a third report on November 16; when we checked its news list on November 17, there was nothing newer.
What client companies should do today
Reset your Shippio password, and separate reused passwords
The company says it reset all users' login sessions and passwords when it restarted the service. Set a new password using "Forgot your password?" on the login screen.
It strongly recommends changing the password on other services too if you used the same one there. It says Shippio passwords are managed by an external authentication service and were not taken, but a reset is a good time to separate them (see Choosing a password manager).
Do not open documents or contacts you do not recognise
The company says malicious files were uploaded to shipments, and that it has found no sign they were downloaded on the customer side. If a document you do not recognise is attached to a shipment after the restart, do not open it and tell the company's contact.
Do the same for suspicious emails or calls posing as company staff (for example asking for passwords or verification codes). The company says it does not ask for passwords, verification codes or API keys, and asks you not to open the link in an unexpected password-reset email either.
Verify shipment, invoice and bank-detail messages by a separate channel
The shipment information taken includes what is shipped, schedules and parties, and some customers' document contents were taken. That is material for convincing fake messages with correct partner names, goods and dates.
For anything about "customs documents", "sending an invoice", "freight payment" or "changing bank details", do not act on the email or its link. Confirm by a phone number you already know or a contact you verified at contract time. Inside your company, also set a rule that no one changes a payment destination alone (see What is phishing?).
Check data from before the stop against your originals
The company asks you to compare data downloaded before the service stopped, CSV files and data imported through the API with your originals before using it for work. It says it has not confirmed that business data such as shipments was rewritten, but it did find unauthorized accounts created and some configuration data written.
Re-set up share links and API integrations, and look for accounts you do not recognise
The company invalidated all previously issued shipment share links; reissue them if needed. If you use external API integrations you need to obtain access tokens again, and you may be asked to reissue API keys.
The company says it deleted the unauthorized accounts and API credentials. As a precaution, it is worth looking once through your team's member list and API key list for anything you do not recognise (this is our suggestion, not the company's instruction).
Wait for an individual notice; use the official contact
The company says it has contacted customers whose document contents were taken individually since November 5, and is contacting people whose personal information was taken in sequence. Use the contact for users in its notice (support@shippio.zohodesk.jp); it warns that replies may take time.
What happened (from Shippio's notices)
Shippio, Inc. published its first report on November 4, its second on November 5 and its third on November 16, 2026. Everything below is based on them. The first two reports were later edited with additions and corrections; this article uses the latest content.
October 30
The company confirmed improper access to its internal work tool had occurred from this date.About 19:30 on November 1 to about 17:00 on November 2
The Shippio Platform was accessed without authorization several times by an outside third party.November 2
The service was temporarily suspended from 10:40. About 11:40 the internal work tool used as the entry route was stopped. At 17:38 the company finished blocking the unauthorized access to the platform.November 4
First report published at 9:00.November 5
Service began restarting in sequence from about 9:20. All users' passwords were reset and all earlier share links invalidated. Second report published.November 16
Third report published (state as of 16:00 on November 13). It corrected that customers' billing amounts were not taken and said a preliminary report had been filed with the Personal Information Protection Commission.
- Cause (company's explanation)
- A tool used for internal work was misused, and the credentials stored in it were used to access the company's systems. The detailed cause is under investigation
- Information viewed
- Company name, team name, address, phone number: all customers. Shipment information (what is shipped, schedules, parties) and document file names and types: almost all customers with registered shipments
- Information taken
- Document file contents: about 1,300 files actually downloaded. Some internal shared files were also taken and may contain customer information; under investigation
- User information
- Users' names and email addresses are in scope. The company does not hold users' phone number data, so it did not leak (corrected on November 5). Passwords are managed by an external authentication service and were not taken
- Billing-related information
- Included in the second report, but later log analysis showed customers' billing amounts were not taken. Billing line items for some shipments (item names, quantities, the company's cost and similar) were taken (third report)
- Data damage
- Unauthorized user accounts and API credentials created (about 1,100 teams), some configuration data written, and malicious files uploaded to shipments. No rewriting of business data confirmed. The company says it has deleted or restored these
- Response
- Blocked the routes, changed related credentials, stopped the work tool, reset all users' passwords, invalidated share links. Filed a preliminary report with the Personal Information Protection Commission. Consulting an outside security specialist on cause and scope
What is known and what is not
State as of November 17, 2026 (reflecting the third report of November 16). We will rewrite this table when follow-ups appear.
| Item | What the notices say | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Company name, team name, address, phone number | Viewed for all customers | Leak confirmed (company) |
| Shipment information, document file names and types | Viewed for almost all customers with registered shipments | Leak confirmed (company) |
| Document file contents | About 1,300 files actually downloaded; details under investigation | Leak confirmed (company) |
| Users' names and email addresses | In scope | Leak confirmed (company) |
| Internal shared files | Some taken; may contain customer information; under investigation | Possible (company) |
| Billing amounts | Customers' billing amounts were not taken; billing line items for some shipments (item names, quantities, the company's cost and similar) were | Confirmed (company, third report) |
| Users' passwords | Managed by an external authentication service; not taken | Not included (company) |
| Users' phone number data | Not held, not leaked (corrected on November 5) | Not included (company) |
| Unauthorized accounts and API credentials | Created in about 1,100 teams; deleted | Confirmed (company) |
| Rewriting of business data | Not confirmed at present | Not confirmed (company) |
| Misuse and secondary harm | Not confirmed at present | Not confirmed (company) |
| Cause | Misuse of an internal work tool and the credentials stored in it; detailed cause under investigation | Partly disclosed |
| Service status | Restarting in sequence since about 9:20 on November 5; automatic tracking updates for the stopped period are not backfilled | Confirmed (company) |
| Range of people whose personal information was taken | Range and items under investigation; individual notices in sequence | Under investigation |
What shipment information and documents can be used for
In general, a combination of shipment contents and documents is useful for messages that pretend to know the deal. This does not mean any of it has happened in this incident.
- Shipment contents, schedules, parties + partner names: realistic notices about "a shipping delay" or "customs documents to confirm"
- Document contents (invoices, shipping documents) + names and email addresses: a fake invoice copied from a real one with only the bank details changed, or a change request
- A malicious file attached to a shipment: a file that looks like a document on the company's own screen (the company says there is no sign customers downloaded such files)
So judge a document or message not by whether its content looks correct, but by who sent it and by which route.
Sources (public record)
This article is based on the public information below. We do not speculate about causes or methods that have not been disclosed. We also checked the company's news list on November 17.
- Shippio, Inc., "Apology and report on the leak of personal information and temporary service suspension following unauthorized access to our platform" (first report, November 4, 2026, Japanese) — shippio.io
- Shippio, Inc., "Resumption of platform service and report on unauthorized access (second report)" (November 5, 2026, Japanese) — shippio.io
- Shippio, Inc., "Notice Regarding Unauthorized Access to Shippio Platform (Third Report)" (November 16, 2026) — shippio.io
Update history
2026-11-17: First version, based on Shippio's first (November 4), second (November 5) and third (November 16) reports, using the latest content (billing amounts not taken, phone number data not leaked, and so on). We checked the company's news list the same day; nothing newer than the third report had been posted. We will update this article when a follow-up appears.
Read next
- Unauthorized access to a logistics contractor: Unauthorized access to a company that handles e-commerce logistics
- Cases where valid credentials were the way in: How 2026 breaches in Japan got in
- Preparing for fake invoices and shipment messages: What is phishing?
- Passwords: Choosing a password manager / Choosing multi-factor authentication
- Other 2026 incidents: list of breaches and cyberattacks (Japan and worldwide)