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Unauthorized Access to the Studio Website Builder: All Users' Data and Form Submissions May Have Leaked — What Form Senders and Site Owners Should Do

On October 16, 2026, Studio Inc. said unauthorized access to its no-code website builder Studio may have exposed every user's account data, the contents of forms submitted on Studio-built sites, API keys and more. Client notices, and what form senders and site owners should do today.

Published 2026-10-20 Updated 2026-10-20 Last verified 2026-10-20 24 min read

Who this is for: people who have sent a contact, document request, event, job application or other form on a company's or organization's site built with Studio (studio.design), and companies, organizations and agencies that build sites with Studio. This article is based on the official notices of Studio Inc. and of the client companies and organizations that disclosed impact. It does not cover how the attack was carried out. The sources are in Japanese.

Developing: this article will be updated as the organisation publishes more

As of October 20, 2026

Not yet known

  • Which customers are affected, and how many
  • Whether any secondary harm (unauthorized logins, misuse of data) has occurred
  • Which feature and what vulnerability (results of the cause investigation)
  • Measures to prevent a recurrence
  • How reports to the PPC will be made (whether Studio and clients report jointly)

Studio Inc. says it will publish the scope and number of affected customers, the results of its investigation into secondary harm, and the cause and prevention measures as follow-ups on its notice page once confirmed. On October 17 and 18 it updated the notice page and published a guidance page (FAQ) for this incident.

What form senders should do today

1

Check the notice of the site owner you sent the form to

Studio is a service companies, local governments and organizations use to build their own websites. If you sent a form, you sent your data to the organization that runs the site, not to Studio. So whether you are affected depends on which site's form you used.

Open the notice for the site you contacted in the "Check whether you are affected" table below. For organizations not in the table, check the news section of their official site. According to Studio Inc., people who sent forms may be contacted by the site owner. The company also takes questions through its "unauthorized access inquiry" form (reachable from its guidance page, in Japanese).

2

Do not open links, even in messages that mention what you sent

People write more than their name and email in forms. Company names, phone numbers, addresses and the details of their question are common, and Uzabase's notice lists date of birth, gender, career history and income.

A message from someone who knows those details looks real. Even if an email, SMS or call refers to something you actually sent ("about your recent inquiry", "thank you for requesting our brochure"), do not open its links or attachments; check through the contact details on the official site you open yourself (how to spot it: What is phishing?).

3

Do not give card numbers or verification codes over the phone

If you wrote your phone number or address in a form, consider that calls or letters claiming to come from a company are possible too, not just email. Several client companies state in their notices that they never ask for passwords or credit card numbers by email or phone. If asked, hang up and call back on the number listed on the official site.

4

You may get an email from Studio even without a Studio account

Studio Inc. says the email address, user name and country of residence (estimated by the company from the IP address used to apply) of people who applied for early access to its AI site-building feature "Studio AI" (first called "Auto") between December 2022 and August 2023 may also have leaked, and it is contacting them individually. The subject line is (in Japanese) "【重要】不正アクセスによる、先行利用のお申し込み情報の流出に関するお詫び". No passwords or payment details were collected in that application, so no password change is needed, the company says.

Remember this is still at the 'may have leaked' stage

Studio Inc. says it has not confirmed that a third party actually took the data. It is treating the data as taken all the same. Whether any secondary harm has occurred is under investigation. There is no need to rush to cancel anything or to send more personal data to anyone. Not responding to unfamiliar contacts is what you can do now.

Check whether you are affected (notices from client companies and organizations)

Companies and organizations that built sites with Studio have each published notices. The table lists those this site checked by opening each organization's official page (as of October 20, 2026). Many others have also published notices.

Counts are as each organization stated. They are counted differently (for example, whether repeat submissions by the same person are included), so they cannot be added up.

OrganizationForms in scope (as stated)Records (as stated)Main items (as stated)StatusDate
LuupFour forms, including port installation requests, Unimo inquiries and questions on the revised Road Traffic Act (various periods, Feb 2022–Dec 2025)21,368 in total (includes repeat submissions by the same person)Name, contact details (email, phone), address, company and department, and more. Data registered in the LUUP app is not in scopePossible (company)Oct 16
Link-U GroupThe contact form on the company's corporate site (it says the impact is limited to the corporate sites of the company and its consolidated subsidiaries)7,663 (as of Oct 16)Items not stated (scope being checked). No impact on the services the group runsPossible (company)Oct 16
TRUSTARTInquiry and document request forms on service pages (Dec 2021–May 2026)About 1,440 (includes repeat and test submissions)Name, company, company URL, job title, email, phone, company size, inquiry type. User data of its services is not in scopePossible (company)Oct 19
Saitama Prefecture (Saitama Green Forest Museum)Event applications and inquiries on the museum's site162 (as of Oct 16)Items not stated (whether data leaked and its scope are being checked)Possible (prefecture)Oct 16
RewiredForm on the "App Unity" site (around Feb–Apr 2024; no longer used, but the data remained in Studio)6Email, name, company, phone, inquiry details and morePossible (company)Oct 19
UzabaseContact forms on sites it built and ran with StudioNot statedName, date of birth, gender, address, phone, email, and other information entered in forms (affiliation, career history, income, etc.). Speeda and NewsPicks accounts and passwords are not in scopePossible (company)Oct 19
Ryukyu ShimpoApplication and contact forms on its corporate site (some data that remained in Studio)Not stated (affected people emailed on Oct 16)Name, address, email, company, phone, inquiry detailsPossible (company)Oct 16
Kufu Company HoldingsFive group companies that used Studio (Kufu Company, Kufu Sumai, Kufu Wedding, KidsStar, Seven Signatures International) each published a noticeNot statedEach company is checking whether and which data is affectedUnder investigation (company)Oct 16

On the same Studio-built site, what leaked depends on what you wrote

The items depend on what the form asked and what you wrote in free-text fields. Luup and TRUSTART say free-text fields may contain other information depending on what was written. Some forms, such as job applications or consultations, ask for career history or income. Think back to what you wrote in that form.

What happened (according to Studio Inc.)

The following is based on Studio Inc.'s October 16, 2026 notice (updated October 17 and 18), its October 17 notice for form users, and the guidance page (FAQ) published on October 18.

  1. September 30 – October 1, 2026 (Japan time)

    A third party exploits a vulnerability in some Studio features to access the company's cloud environment and makes its data retrievable from outside (the period confirmed so far).
  2. October 13

    Unauthorized access found in an internal investigation.
  3. October 13–14

    Vulnerability fixed and the route used for the access closed. The data is no longer retrievable from outside.
  4. About 2:30 a.m., October 14

    Everyone logged in to Studio logged out once, for safety.
  5. October 14

    The key needed for the Google Sheets integration updated (credentials that may have leaked can no longer be used).
  6. October 16

    Notice (first report) published. Per-feature emails sent to owners of projects using API integrations, password-protected pages, forms, custom proxy or webhook notifications. Client companies and organizations begin publishing their own notices from the same day.
  7. October 17

    Notice for form users published, asking them, at the PPC's request, to put individual reports to the PPC on hold. The key that encrypts form submissions, external API keys and similar data switched to a new key.
  8. October 18

    Guidance page (FAQ) for the incident published. The notice page updated with the response status and changed steps for the Google Sheets integration and custom proxy.
All users
Account data may have leaked (numbers under investigation)
Sep 30–Oct 1
Confirmed period of unauthorized access
Until Oct 14
Data remained retrievable from outside
None found
Actual taking, or changes or deletion of data

Data of people who sent forms

What they sent in forms on Studio-built sites (name, contact details, inquiry and more)

To do: check the site's notice; watch for fake contacts

Data of Studio users

User name, email address, hashed password

To do: change the Studio password and any reused one

Keys site owners stored

API keys and tokens, protected-page passwords, Sheets integration, proxy key, webhook URLs, live preview URLs

To do: rotate as Studio's per-feature emails describe

Data that may have leaked, grouped by whose data it is (organized by this site from Studio Inc.'s notice)
Data that may have leaked (according to Studio Inc.)
Account data
User names, email addresses, hashed passwords and more (all registered users)
Data managed in Studio
Design editor and CMS content, form submissions, Google reCAPTCHA v3 settings, webhook notification URLs. The content of password-protected pages is included
Live preview
URLs of live previews used to check pages before publishing
Credentials in settings
API keys and tokens for external services registered in API integrations, passwords of password-protected pages (hashed), Google Sheets integration credentials, custom proxy keys
Encrypted data
Form submissions, API keys and tokens, Sheets credentials, proxy keys, reCAPTCHA settings and webhook URLs may be known even where stored encrypted, because the key needed to decrypt them was read in the same access
Form responses in scope
Responses stored in Studio, including those moved to the trash (not "permanently deleted"), test submissions from live previews, and responses that could not be shown because they exceeded the plan limit. For attachments, only the file names; not the file contents
Form responses not in scope
Responses sent while "save form results to Studio" was off, responses permanently deleted before September 30, and responses to embedded forms from other services (such as Google Forms)
Studio AI early access
Email address, user name and country of people who applied between December 2022 and August 2023 (including people without a Studio account)
Cause as described
A third party exploited a vulnerability in some Studio features. Details not disclosed
Response
Vulnerability fixed and route closed; the company's own credentials, including those used for payments and login, replaced; encryption key switched (October 17) and older data being re-encrypted

According to the company, the credentials the third party obtained included permission to change data, but they have been disabled. It examined the record of operations made with those credentials and confirmed there is no record of design editor or CMS content being changed or deleted. It says it is reporting to the PPC and dealing with other relevant authorities.

What we know and what we don't

Status as of October 20, 2026. When follow-ups are published, the status column will be updated.

ItemWhat the notice saysStatus
Period of unauthorized accessSeptember 30 to October 1, 2026 (Japan time; the period confirmed so far). Data remained retrievable from outside until October 14Confirmed so far (company)
Account data (user names, emails, hashed passwords and more)May have leaked for all registered usersPossible (company)
Form submissionsResponses stored in Studio. Even encrypted ones may be knownPossible (company)
Contents of files attached to formsOnly file names are in scope; contents are notNot included (company)
Responses to embedded forms from other servicesNot in scope because they do not pass through Studio (the embed code itself is in scope as design editor content)Not included (company)
API keys and tokens, webhook URLs, proxy keys and moreEven encrypted ones may be knownPossible (company)
Whether a third party actually took the dataNot confirmed. Treated as takenNone found (company)
Changes or deletion of dataNo record of changes or deletion found in the operation recordsNone found (company)
Scope and number of affected customersTo be published after reviewUnder investigation
Secondary harm (unauthorized logins, misuse)Under investigationUnder investigation
CauseExploitation of a vulnerability in some features. Details not stated. Arranging an investigation by an outside specialistUnder investigation
Reports to the PPCAt the PPC's request, form users' individual reports on hold. Joint reporting to be discussedTo be discussed (company)

Counts in client notices are often not numbers of people

Luup's 21,368 and TRUSTART's about 1,440 are record counts that include repeat submissions by the same person and test submissions. Link-U Group's and Saitama Prefecture's numbers are as of October 16, and both say whether data leaked and its scope are still being checked. Do not read them as numbers of people or confirmed counts.

What the leaked items can be used for

In general, when these items come together, the following misuse becomes possible. This does not mean it happened in this case.

  • Name + email + inquiry details: fake emails that refer to topics only the sender would know ("regarding your inquiry")
  • Company + job title + phone number: material for calls posing as a business partner or sales contact, or emails posing as invoices
  • Date of birth, address, career history, income (for forms that asked): material for fake identity checks, or for making investment or side-job pitches look credible
  • Site owners' API keys and webhook URLs: data in external services read with the key; fake notifications sent to the webhook destination (such as a chat service)

Another case in which one service exposed data from many client companies is the October 2026 unauthorized access to Commune. There too, items and numbers differed by client, and the way to check was the notice of the company that ran each community.

What organizations with Studio sites should do

Studio Inc. separates its requests to all customers from those to customers using certain features. The steps below follow its order. The affected project names and what to do are in the per-feature emails sent on October 16, 2026 (subject lines start with "【重要】不正アクセスに伴う、"). The emails go to project owners; if you cannot find one, check your spam folder and contact the company's inquiry form, it says.

1

Change your Studio password (and any other service where you used it)

This applies if you log in with an email address and password. The company strongly recommends also changing the password on other services where you used the same one. If you only use Google or Facebook login and have never set a Studio password, this is not needed.

However, the company says that if you ever registered or logged in with an email and password, a password may be set; in that case reset it from "Forgot your password?" on the login screen. For what hashing means, see password hashing; to stop reusing passwords, see password managers.

2

Delete live preview URLs and reissue them if needed

The company has not confirmed that any issued live preview URL was identified, but cannot fully rule it out, so it asks owners to delete them. A deleted URL stops working. If you still need to share a preview, issue a new URL after deleting and send it again.

3

Rotate API integration keys in this order: issue a new key, update Studio, revoke the old key

This applies if you registered API keys or tokens for external services (such as content and document services) in Data Connect API or API Integration (Beta). Keys for external services are managed by the issuing service, so Studio cannot disable them; owners must rotate them, the company says.

The order is: issue a new key in each service, update the Studio setting to the new key, and finally revoke the old key in each service. Revoking the old key first may stop the integration on your site. The company also recommends revoking keys for external services you no longer use. Check each service's usage history for any unexpected use since September 30, 2026 (why deleting is not enough and revoking is needed: credentials published on GitHub still worked).

4

Change passwords of password-protected pages and tell viewers the new one

The passwords were stored hashed, but the company cannot fully rule out their recovery, so it asks owners to change them. The content of password-protected pages is itself among the data that may have leaked. If you put confidential material behind a password, treat its content as known.

5

Personal data collected in forms: consider notifying individuals; for the PPC report, wait for Studio's guidance

In its October 16 per-feature email, the company said that site owners who collected visitors' personal data through forms may, as businesses handling personal information, need to report to the PPC and notify the individuals.

Then on October 17, at the PPC's request, it asked customers to put individual reports to the PPC on hold. It plans to discuss whether it can compile reports and file them jointly with customers, and will announce the process and how deadlines are handled. Only the PPC report is on hold; notifying individuals is not. The company's guidance page lists points for deciding whether notification is needed (whether the form was used for business, whether responses contain personal data, whether the data may be affected) and a template for a notice on your own site. It also suggests consulting a lawyer or other specialist when unsure.

6

Google Sheets integration: disconnect, remove access in Google, reconnect

The company updated the key needed for the connection on October 14 and says credentials that may have leaked can no longer be used. To be more certain, it recommends disconnecting the integration in Studio, removing Studio's access on the "Linked apps" page of the Google account, and connecting again. For sheets that were linked, check the version history for any unexpected edits other than added responses between September 30 and October 14.

7

Replace the custom proxy key and report completion

The company has issued a new proxy key and applied it to affected projects. Change the key in your own server settings (reverse proxy, CDN and so on) and tell the company's inquiry form when done; it will then disable the old key. The deadline is 30 days from receiving the October 16 email.

8

Switch webhook URLs in this order: create a new URL, update Studio, disable the old URL

A third party who knows the URL may be able to send messages to the destination. The company recommends creating a new URL in the destination service (such as a chat service’s incoming webhook), updating it in Studio's project settings and checking with "test send", then disabling the old URL. Also check for unexpected notifications since September 30, and do not open links in any you find.

reCAPTCHA secret keys and embed code

For the Google reCAPTCHA v3 secret key, the company is not asking all customers to replace it. It says the key alone cannot be used to view form responses or to enter Google's admin console. It advises switching to a new key if forms stop submitting or the console shows an unexpected rise in use. Embed code pasted into Studio is in scope as design editor content, so if that code contains API keys or other values that must stay secret, switch them to new values in the external service, the company says.

This site's view: form responses stayed in Studio after the forms were no longer used

Lining up the client notices, a notable share of the data in scope came not from forms in use today but from forms used in the past. Rewired says responses to a form it used around February to April 2024 remained in Studio after it changed its setup. TRUSTART lists responses sent from December 2021 to May 2026, and Luup lists responses from various periods since February 2022.

According to Studio Inc., responses only moved to the trash are in scope, while responses permanently deleted before September 30 and those sent while "save form results to Studio" was off are not. The setting not to store responses, and deleting old ones, made the difference to what was exposed.

1

Decide, for each form, where responses go and how long they are kept

If you already receive responses by email notification or in your own system, review whether you need to keep them in the Studio dashboard. If you do, set a period (for example, a set number of months after the inquiry is handled) and, once it passes, export and then "permanently delete" them. Moving them to the trash is not deleting them.

2

When you stop using a service, delete the data on it

When you move forms to another service or close a site, check that no data remains on the old service. TRUSTART also says it will review its procedure for deleting data when it stops using an external service.

3

Keep a list of the keys you store in external services

In this case, owners were asked to change passwords, API keys, password-protected pages, the Sheets integration, proxy keys and webhook URLs. A list of which key is registered in which service for which project makes it harder to miss one next time (similar cases on the hosting side: when your web hosting provider is breached, unauthorized access to some ConoHa WING servers).

For the order in which to check your own systems for anomalies, see Japan's October 2026 warnings on unauthorized access and what to check this week.

Sources (public record)

The facts in this article are based on the public information below (in Japanese). We have not speculated about undisclosed methods of the unauthorized access.

  • Studio Inc., "[Important] Apology and request regarding the information leak caused by unauthorized access (first report)" (October 16, 2026; updated October 17 and 18) — studio.design
  • Studio Inc., "[Important] To customers using the form feature: guidance on reporting to the Personal Information Protection Commission (first report)" (October 17, 2026) — studio.design
  • Studio Inc., "Guidance on the unauthorized access to Studio" (October 18, 2026) — studio.design
  • Luup, Inc., notice on the possible leak of personal data sent through its web forms (October 16, 2026) — luup.sc
  • Link-U Group Inc., notice on the possible leak of personal data following the unauthorized access at Studio Inc. (October 16, 2026) — content.link-u.co.jp
  • TRUSTART Inc., apology and notice on the possible leak of contact form submissions on its website (October 19, 2026) — trustart.co.jp
  • Saitama Prefecture, notice on the possible leak of personal data following the unauthorized access at Studio Inc. (October 16, 2026) — pref.saitama.lg.jp
  • Rewired Inc., apology and notice on the possible leak of personal data due to unauthorized access to an external service it uses (October 19, 2026) — rewired.jp
  • Uzabase, Inc., notice on the possible information leak following unauthorized access to the no-code website platform Studio (October 19, 2026) — uzabase.com
  • Ryukyu Shimpo, notice on the possible leak of personal data following the unauthorized access at Studio Inc. (October 16, 2026) — corp.ryukyushimpo.jp
  • Kufu Company Holdings Inc., impact on its group of the unauthorized access to the external service Studio (first report) (October 16, 2026) — kufu.co.jp

Update history

2026-10-20: First version. Based on Studio Inc.'s October 16 notice (including the October 17 and 18 updates), its October 17 notice for form users, its October 18 guidance page, and notices from eight client companies and organizations. Will be updated once the numbers, secondary harm and the results of the cause investigation are published.

FAQ

QWhat leaked in the Studio incident?
A

According to Studio Inc.'s October 16, 2026 notice, the following may have leaked for every registered customer: account data (user names, email addresses, hashed passwords and more), design editor and CMS content, the contents of forms submitted on sites, live preview URLs, API keys and tokens for external services registered in API integrations, passwords of password-protected pages, and webhook notification URLs. Some encrypted data may also be known, because the decryption key was read in the same access. The company has not confirmed that a third party actually took the data, but is treating it as taken.

QI used a contact form on a site built with Studio. Am I affected?
A

Responses sent through Studio's form feature and stored in Studio are in scope. It is hard to tell from the outside which sites are built with Studio, so check the notice of the site owner you contacted (the table in this article lists notices this site checked on the official pages). Studio Inc. says the site owner may contact you. Responses sent through an embedded form from another service, such as Google Forms, do not pass through Studio and are not in scope, the company says.

QShould I change my password?
A

If you have a Studio account, yes. Studio Inc. says passwords were stored hashed and are hard to recover, but it cannot fully rule this out, so it asks everyone who logs in with an email address and password to change it, and strongly recommends changing the same password on any other service. People who only use Google or Facebook login and never set a Studio password do not need to. If you only sent a form, you have no Studio password, so this does not apply.

QWhat caused it?
A

Studio Inc. says a third party exploited a vulnerability in some Studio features to access its cloud environment. It has not said which feature or what kind of vulnerability. It says the vulnerability has been fixed and the route closed. It is arranging for an outside specialist to investigate the cause and will publish the results and prevention measures once confirmed.

QWhat should I do if I get a message claiming to be from Studio or a site owner?
A

Studio Inc. warns that emails and messages pretending to be from it may be sent, and asks people not to open unfamiliar links or attachments. It never asks for passwords or credentials by email or phone, and its emails about this incident do not include links asking for them. Its emails come from @studio.design or @studio.site addresses, or from the addresses listed on its help page about the emails it sends, and its login page is at app.studio.design. For messages that claim to be from a site owner, check on the official site you open yourself, not through links in the message.

QWe collected personal data through Studio forms. How should we report to the PPC?
A

On October 17, at the PPC's request, Studio Inc. asked customers who plan to report to the PPC to put individual reports on hold for now. It plans to discuss with the PPC whether it can report on behalf of customers jointly, and will announce the process and how deadlines are handled during the hold. Only the report to the PPC is on hold; customers may still need to notify the people who sent the forms, and the company asks them to keep considering that. Its guidance also suggests consulting a lawyer or other specialist when needed.