Security Guides

Osaki Electric Ransomware Attack: VPN Login Broken, Smart Meter Production and Shipping Halted, Apparent Technical Data Posted (Second Report, November 20)

Osaki Electric says attackers broke VPN authentication on Nov 15, 2026 and smart meter production is halted. What partners and IT staff should do.

Published 2026-11-21 Updated 2026-11-21 Last verified 2026-11-21 11 min read
On this page

For: business partners of Osaki Electric Co., Ltd. and customers of its smart meters and similar products, and IT staff at organisations that use a VPN device. This article is based on the company's first report (November 18) and second report (November 20) and does not cover attack techniques.

Developing: this article will be updated as the organisation publishes more

Who is affected

business partners of Osaki Electric Co., Ltd. and customers of its smart meters and similar products, and IT staff at organisations that use a VPN device.

Confirmed so farSee the table ↓
  • Encryption
  • Production and shipping halt
  • Intrusion route
3 more
  • Encrypted scope
  • Effect on products and services
  • Backups

Listed as possibly affected

  • Intrusion time
  • How authentication was broken
  • Posted technical information
Not yet confirmed
  • Restart date for production and shipping
  • Content and scope of the posted technical information, and whether other information leaked
  • Whether personal information leaked
2 more
  • How the accounts without multi-factor authentication came to exist, and whether the passwords had leaked beforehand
  • Impact on financial results
What to do nowSee the steps ↓
  1. Partners: confirm delivery dates and orders with your business contact directly
  2. Partners: do not respond to emails or calls imitating the company
  3. Partners: wait for the company's contact about whether your information is included
2 more
  1. Organisations with a VPN: compare every account with its multi-factor authentication status
  2. Organisations with a VPN: watch repeated failed logins and logins at unusual hours
Last checked
As of November 21, 2026
Follow-up plans and what we checked

The company says it will announce items it should disclose, such as investigation progress, the recovery outlook and whether information leaked, on its website. The second report says the investigation is continuing and that its content may change with future findings.

What partners and organisations with a VPN should do today

1

Partners: confirm delivery dates and orders with your business contact directly

The second report asks anyone with questions about delivery of existing orders or future orders to contact the person in the business unit they deal with. As of November 20, the restart of production and shipping was not set, and the first report says the company explained the stop to its customers individually.

Do not only wait to be contacted; if you have deliveries due, ask your contact for the status.

2

Partners: do not respond to emails or calls imitating the company

The company asks people to be careful of suspicious emails and calls in its name. If you receive one, do not open attachments or click URLs, and report it to the business unit contact.

While trade is disrupted, messages imitating "a new payment account", "a delivery date change" or "a resend of documents" are easier to slip through. That is this site's general caution; the company has not said such messages have arrived. Confirm any change of payment account or contact details using a phone number you already know.

3

Partners: wait for the company's contact about whether your information is included

If the posted information includes information managed under a confidentiality agreement with a partner, the company says it will contact that partner individually. As of November 20 we could not find an announcement that this has started. It helps to list the drawings, specifications and personal data you gave the company, so you can judge quickly when contact comes.

4

Organisations with a VPN: compare every account with its multi-factor authentication status

Put the list of accounts registered on the VPN next to the list of accounts with multi-factor authentication enabled. Do not check only the accounts people use daily.

  • Accounts used by maintenance and operations staff or outside contractors
  • Shared accounts, old test accounts, and accounts of people who left or moved
  • If the VPN uses a separate authentication server, that server's settings

Add multi-factor authentication to any that lack it, or disable them if unused. Setup is covered in our multi-factor authentication guide.

5

Organisations with a VPN: watch repeated failed logins and logins at unusual hours

The company says the intrusion is estimated to have begun around 1:30 on a Sunday. You need a way not to overlook night and weekend connections. Review the VPN device logs for repeated failed logins to the same account in a short time and for successful logins at unusual hours or from unusual places, and set up an alert. This is a general check suggested by the incident, not a statement that the company should have done it.

Once VPN authentication is broken, it is a way into the whole internal network

According to the second report, the company's network was built to defend at the boundary with the outside, and the only point from which the internal network could be reached directly from outside was the VPN device that was entered. The company therefore considers entry by another route unlikely, and says it has not confirmed unauthorised access before November 15 so far.

A VPN device is the entrance to the internal network from outside. If authentication there is weak, the person who gets through can act like an internal user. That VPN devices are a leading entry point in Japanese ransomware cases is covered in VPN appliances are the main way in for ransomware.

In the second report the company says authentication was broken; it does not name a device vulnerability as the cause. So keeping the device up to date is not enough; the account settings matter, which is why the checklist above turns the facts into action.

What happened (from Osaki Electric's notices)

The following is based on the company's notices of November 18 (first report) and November 20 (second report), 2026.

  1. 1:30, Sunday, November 15, 2026

    Unauthorised access via the VPN device is estimated to have begun (second report).
  2. 10:35, Tuesday, November 17

    Encryption of data on servers confirmed.
  3. From noon, November 17

    External connections cut, including the VPN device. Production-related systems stopped.
  4. Wednesday, November 18

    First report published. The company says it consulted and reported to police and other authorities.
  5. Thursday, November 19

    The company noticed information posted on a site that appears to be run by the attacker.
  6. Friday, November 20

    Second report published. Part of the intrusion time and route became known.
Halted
Smart meter etc. production and shipping (restart not set)
3 sites
Production-related systems stopped (Saitama works and two group companies)
Some
Virtual servers encrypted
Intact
Backup data confirmed (recovery under way)
What the company has disclosed
Type of attack
Ransomware (malware that demands a ransom)
Intrusion time and route
Around 1:30 on November 15, 2026, authentication on the VPN device was broken and the internal network was entered. Some accounts without multi-factor authentication remained, and the company infers it is highly likely they were broken by password attempts
Damage
Some virtual servers were encrypted. The network, including the intrusion route, has been cut entirely
Posted information
On November 19 it found technical information that appears to be stored on its systems posted on a site that appears to be run by the attacker. Content and scope under investigation
Products
An attack on internal systems; products and services such as smart meters were not themselves targeted and are not affected, it says
Recovery
Backups confirmed intact and system recovery under way. Operations to resume in phases where safety is confirmed
Response
An emergency response headquarters led by the President and COO. Investigating with outside specialists. Consulted and reported to police and other authorities

What is known and what is not

State as of November 21, 2026. When a follow-up appears, the status column in this table will be rewritten.

ItemWhat the notice saysStatus
EncryptionData on servers found encrypted at about 10:35 on November 17Confirmed (company)
Production and shipping haltSmart meter etc. production and shipping stopped at the Saitama works and related sitesConfirmed (company)
Intrusion timeEstimated around 1:30 on November 15Possible (company estimate)
Intrusion routeVPN device authentication was broken. No other route confirmed; company considers it unlikelyConfirmed (company; other routes under investigation)
How authentication was brokenHighly likely password attempts against accounts without multi-factor authenticationPossible (company inference)
Encrypted scopeSome virtual serversConfirmed (company; scope under investigation)
Posted technical informationTechnical information that appears to be stored on its systems found posted on November 19Possible (company says "appears"; content and scope under investigation)
Partners' confidential informationPartners will be contacted individually if includedUnder investigation
Leak of personal informationIf confirmed, will report to the Personal Information Protection Commission and notify those concernedNot stated
Effect on products and servicesNot themselves targeted; not affectedConfirmed (company)
Intrusion before November 15Not confirmed so farUnder investigation
BackupsConfirmed intact; recovery under wayConfirmed (company)
Production and shipping restartPhased restart from areas confirmed safe; date not setNot set
Impact on resultsNot set at present, depending on recovery timeNot set

How to read this: 'estimated' and 'inferred' mean the investigation is not finished

The intrusion time is described as "estimated" and the way authentication was broken as "highly likely". The company says the investigation is continuing and the content may change. This article keeps confirmed facts separate from the company's estimates and inferences.

What happens when systems are both encrypted and information is posted

In general, in ransomware cases attackers may not only encrypt data and stop operations but also threaten to publish information they took. Here the company says it found information posted, but it has not disclosed how the information was taken or whether a ransom was demanded.

For partners, two effects are real.

  • Delivery: while production and shipping are halted, delivery plans move. Recovery is to be phased, so asking your contact about individual orders will tell you more quickly than waiting for the full restart.
  • Information you gave the company: drawings, specifications, terms of trade and contact details may be included. What is included depends on the company's investigation and contact.

For IT staff at manufacturers and organisations with equipment: what the published facts support

Three points can be drawn from the disclosure. No speculation is included.

  • One entrance can still let everything in: the company says the VPN device was the only point from which the internal network could be reached directly from outside. Few entrances is a strength, but the strength of authentication at that one decides the whole.
  • Exceptions were left: even where multi-factor authentication is introduced, accounts left without it become an entrance. Compare the list at introduction with real settings after long operation, regularly.
  • Backups are the key to recovery: the company says it confirmed its backup data is intact. Keeping backups apart from the network and testing restoration need to be prepared before an incident.

The minimum security baseline for organisations is summarised in six organisational security measures derived from 2026 incidents.

Sources (public record)

The facts in this article are based on the public information below. We do not speculate on undisclosed intrusion techniques or on the attacker.

  • Osaki Electric Co., Ltd., "Notice regarding production stoppage due to a ransomware cyberattack (second report)" (November 20, 2026, Japanese) — osaki.co.jp
  • Osaki Electric Co., Ltd., "Notice regarding production stoppage due to a ransomware cyberattack (first report)" (November 18, 2026, Japanese) — osaki.co.jp

Update history

2026-11-21: First version, based on the first report of November 18 and the second report of November 20. The company says it will announce investigation progress, the recovery outlook and whether information leaked as they become known, and we will update this article when it does.

Latest breaking reports

All breaking reports →

FAQ

QWhat happened at Osaki Electric?
A

According to the company's first report of November 18, 2026, at about 10:35 on November 17 it confirmed that data on its servers had been encrypted, and from noon that day it cut the connection to external networks. It stopped the production-related systems of the Saitama works and related production sites (two group companies), and production and shipping of smart meters and similar products cannot take place. The second report of November 20 added part of the intrusion time and route.

QHow did the attacker get in?
A

In its second report the company says the unauthorised access is estimated to have occurred around 1:30 on Sunday, November 15, 2026, and that authentication on the VPN device used to connect to the internal network from outside was broken. Some accounts without multi-factor authentication remained, and the company infers that it is highly likely the authentication was broken by repeated password attempts. How those accounts were created, and whether the passwords had leaked beforehand, are under investigation.

QWas information leaked?
A

The second report says that on November 19 the company found technical information that appears to be stored on its systems posted on a site that appears to be run by the attacker. The content and scope of what was posted, and whether other information leaked, are under investigation. If information managed under confidentiality agreements with partners is included, it says it will contact those partners individually. If a leak of personal information is confirmed, it says it will report to the Personal Information Protection Commission and notify the people concerned.

QAre smart meters and other products safe?
A

The company says in the second report that this was an attack on its internal systems, that products and services such as smart meters were not themselves targeted, and that they are not affected. The restart date for production and shipping has not been set.

QWhat if someone claiming to be Osaki Electric contacts me?
A

The company asks anyone who receives a suspicious email or call imitating the company not to open attachments or click links, and to report it to the company's business unit contact. For questions about the delivery of existing orders or future orders, contact the person in the business unit you deal with.

QWhat should I check on my own organisation's VPN today?
A

The company surmises that some accounts without multi-factor authentication remained and that authentication was likely broken by password attempts. That is not an assessment of the company; it is a check that applies generally. Compare the list of accounts that can use the VPN (including shared, maintenance, former-employee and old test accounts) with the settings, and add multi-factor authentication to any that lack it or disable them. The checklist in this article has the steps.